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NAFTA Chapter 11 and Professional
Sports in Canada

ABSTRACT

Modern professional sports leagues are significant
economic enterprises, the most prominent of which span the
political border between the United States and Canada. In
recent decades, local governments in the United States have
invested heavily in professional sports franchises by building
stadiums and arenas, hoping either to prevent the home team
from moving out or to entice someone else's home team to move
in. The willingness to pay of U.S. local governments, coupled
with apparently disadvantageous economic conditions in
Canada,has resulted in a net loss of professionalfranchises for
Canadiancities, in particularfranchises in Canada's national
game, hockey. This Note inquires whether this process harms
Canadian investors in professional sports franchises in a way
that implicates the North American Free Trade Agreement
specifically the Agreement's rules governing
(NAFTA),
investment. Although there is a growing body of adjudications
under NAFTA Chapter 11, U.S. local assistance to professional
sports franchises has not, to date, been the subject of a claim.
This inaction may result from the inertia of U.S. municipal
investment in professional sports, the confusion created by the
unique economic structure of the professional leagues, or the
perception that the professional sports industry is somehow less
worthy of attention. Based on a survey of the types of aid
provided by local governments to professional franchises, the
recent movements of teams in the three relevant leagues, and a
close examination of the economic relationship between
franchises in a single league, this Note argues that Chapter 11
is a potentially relevant, if overlooked, part of the regulatory
landscape. After sketching a hypothetical claim under Chapter
11, the Note concludes with an examination of the NAFTA's
Cultural Exception in light of the steady migration of National
Hockey League franchises out of Canada.
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I. INTRODUCTION

During the mid 1990s, Rod Bryden, owner of the Ottawa
Senators franchise of the National Hockey League (NHL) watched
two of Canada's eight NHL franchises relocate to U.S. cities. 1 The
departing teams found that as player salaries and other operating
expenses increased, their 50-year-old arenas could not produce
enough revenue in small Canadian towns like Winnipeg and Quebec
City to make the franchises profitable. 2 At the same time, U.S. cities
seeking franchises offered to team owners inducements of every
stripe-publicly-funded arenas full of luxury boxes and modern
amenities, favorable leases on these facilities, and relocation bonuses
worth as much as $20 million. 3 In stark contrast to the incentives

1.
William Houston & David Shoalts, Small Market Teams Feel Pinch,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 16, 1994, at D1. In 1995, the Quebec Nordiques
moved from Quebec City, Quebec to Denver, Colorado and became the Avalanche, and
in 1996, the Winnipeg Jets left Winnipeg, Manitoba, and became the Phoenix Coyotes.
Canada's six remaining franchises are the Toronto Maple Leafs, the Montreal
Canadiens, the Vancouver Canucks, the Ottawa Senators, the Calgary Flames, and the
Edmonton Oilers. Richard Sandomir, CanadaKills Subsidy Plan for 6 N.H.L. Teams,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2000, at D1.
2.
See Houston & Shoalts, supra note 1.
3.
Tim Crothers, The Shakedown, SPORTS ILLUS., June 19, 1995, at 78.
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offered by many U.S. cities, Bryden's Senators franchise labored
under an immense tax burden imposed by both the Canadian federal
government and the provincial government in Ottawa. 4 Viewed
together, the playing field for North American professional sports
5
seemed to be something short of even.
Bryden's concerns about the financial health of his franchise and
the basic economics of the NHL were even more immediate when the
Senators filed for bankruptcy protection in January 2003.6 Despite
having one of the lowest payrolls in the league, 7 and leading the NHL
in points,8 the Ottawa franchise buckled under the weight of more
than $100 million in debt, including $14 million owed to the NHL
itself.9 Most critically for the future of hockey in Ottawa, the
Canadian bankruptcy filing left only a short window of time in which
Bryden could make a bid to purchase the team.1 0 Bryden's plan to
purchase the team fell apart in late February 2003 when the main
investor backed out, citing concern over the limited partnership that
was at the heart of Bryden's proposal. 11 Bryden told reporters that
despite his inability to retain control of the franchise, he didn't expect
it to be relocated when sold, 12 but sale on the open market introduces
significant uncertainties about where the Senators will play their
home games in 2004.13
In 1994, Bryden told reporters that "[i]t would be nice if free
trade would include professional sports in what constitutes a
subsidy. ' 14 "If we were making paper instead of entertainment, we'd
trot off to the local tribunal and say this is unfair competition."'15 But

4.
Rachel Alexander, Canada's National Game is Heading South, WASH.
POST, June 2, 1999, at D1.
5.
Houston & Shoalts, supra note 1.
6.
Thomas Heath, Senators' Future Unclear After Bankruptcy Filing, WASH.
POST, Jan. 10, 2003, at D6.
7.
Joe Lapointe, Hockey: A Financial Sign of the Times, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28,
2003, at D1.
8.
Bankrupt Senators Take Over Points Lead, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2003,
Section 8, at 9. In the NHL, a team earns two points for each game won, and one point
for each game tied. Thus, leading the legaue in points is tantamount to having the best
record during the regular season.
9.
Heath, supra note 6.
10.
Id.
11.
Shi Davidi, Senators Are Up For Sale Again, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 28, 2003,
at C1.
12.
Id.
13.
Of the two principal suitors for the franchise, one is a Canadian investor,
pharmaceutical billionaire Eugene Melnyk. Id.
The other possible buyer is the
investor who pulled out of Bryden's deal, U.S. financier Nelson Peltz. Rick Westhead,
Tycoon Peltz to Bid for Senators, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 6, 2003, at C1.
14.
Houston & Shoalts, supra note 1.
15.
Id.
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to date, neither Rod Bryden nor the ownership of any other Canadian
professional sports franchise has sought relief under an international
trade agreement. No Canadian investor has filed a claim alleging
that significant and ongoing financial assistance by U.S. local
governments to the operation of U.S. franchises violates basic
principles governing international investment under the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). But why not? 16 This
Note addresses that question by considering the relevant events of
the past 20 years of municipal investment in sports, the economic
structure of the professional sports leagues, and the relevant
provisions of the NAFTA. These topics relate generally to three
barriers that might explain the absence of arbitration claims in this
industry.
The first possible barrier to a claim under the NAFTA chapter on
investment in this context is the sheer inertia of municipal
investment in professional sports facilities. 17 So much money has
flowed from U.S. cities to professional sports franchises in recent
decades that it is easy think that it cannot be stopped.18 But a few
recent events suggest that transfers from U.S. local government to
professional sports franchises are not inevitable, 19 and responsible
public policy-making demands consultation with every relevant body
of law and regulation before committing public resources to such a

16.
The notion of seeking redress against U.S. cities and franchises through
NAFTA's rules on investment has been before Canadian government and presumably
team ownership at least since 1998 when attorneys Barry Appleton and Marjan
Neceski made a proposal to the Canadian House of Commons Standing Committee on
Canadian Heritage, Sub-Committee on the Study of Sport in Canada regarding the
remedies available to Canadian investors in professional sports franchises under the
NAFTA chapter on investment. See Barry Appleton & Marjan Neceski, NAFTA &
Sports, available at http://www.naftalaw.com/casees/nafta&sports.pdf.
17.
See infra Part II.
18.
See Brett Smith, If You Build It, Will They Come? The Relationship
Between Public Financingof Sports Facilitiesand Quality of Life in America's Cities, 7
GEO. PUB. POL'Y REV. 45 (2001) (reporting a 1998 estimate the "total public funds spent
on professional sports facilities to be an average of $500 million per year, with $7
billion slated to be spent by 2006"). Id.
19.
Taxpayers and some local politicians in U.S. cities have balked at the
notion of committing public funds to the construction of new stadiums. See Financing
New Stadiums, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1998, at A30. In some cases, San Francisco and
MLB's Giants for example, public refusal to subsidize professional sports facilities has
led to private stadium financing. Id. In other situations, a lack of public funding has
caused a vagabond franchise to move on to greener pastures. For example, the NHL's
Jets-formerly of Winnipeg-were unable to obtain public financing in Minneapolis,
and as a result moved on to Phoenix. Al Strachan, Jets to Rise in Phoenix After Getting
Cold Shoulder in Winnipeg and Minneapolis, TORONTO SUN, Nov. 24, 1995, at Sports
17.
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This Note promotes the proposition that NAFTA is a

relevant, if overlooked, part of the regulatory environment.
The second possible barrier is the confusion possibly created by
the unique economic structure of the professional leagues. 20 The mix
of competition and cooperation necessary to carry forth the enterprise
of professional sports has led to a complicated jurisprudential and
regulatory context. 21 In the proposed application of the NAFTA to

professional

sports franchises, there is an

important question

whether the teams in professional sports leagues participate in any
market that is sufficiently competitive that municipal assistance to
one franchise can reasonably be considered a detriment to other
franchises. Because in many cases U.S. antitrust law requires a
definition of relevant product and geographic markets,2 2 this Note
addresses the question of intra-league economic competition by
reference to the body of judicial decisions considering whether federal
antitrust law should apply to the actions of professional sports

leagues.
The third possible barrier is the perception that such a claim is
less worthy of attention because the investment is in a professional
sports franchise and not an "ordinary" industry. 23 The paucity of
published arbitration history under NAFTA's Chapter 11 does
nothing to dispel this misperception, 24 nor does the fact that it seems
difficult to analogize to previous NAFTA claims in the areas of
hazardous waste disposal,2 5 the production and sale of gasoline

20.
See infra Part III.A.
See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposal for the Antitrust Regulation of
21.
Professional Sports, 79 B.U. L. REv. 889, 892 (1999) (noting that "[tihe federal courts'
failure to develop a consistent theory regarding the economic behavior of sports leagues
has prevented them from effectively regulating the leagues' abuses of monopoly
power").
GOETZ & FRED MCCHESNEY, ANTITRUST LAW:
See CHARLES J.
22.
INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 130-31 (1998) (The "[diefinition of relevant

product and geographic markets is an essential, and often outcome-determinative, part
of [Sherman Act] § 1 litigation under the Rule of Reason").
Recall Rod Bryden's distinction between making paper and making
23.
entertainment, supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text; see also infra Part III.
24.
Access to arbitration documents is actually improving through the efforts of
the Parties to the agreement and a few attorneys who are actively involved in NAFTA
arbitrations. The Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Department of
State offer many of the arbitration decisions and related filings. See Canadian Dep't of
For. Aff., Dispute Settlement, at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA-en.asp;
U.S. Dep't of State, NAFTA Investor-State Arbitrations, at http://www.state.gov/
sfl/c3439.htm. Attorney Todd Weiler has also created a web portal that greatly
simplifies the search for documents related to NAFTA arbitrations. See NAFTA
Claims, at http://www.naftaclaims.com.
25.
See Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, Final Award, International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Aug.
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additives, 26 or softwood lumber. 27
But the perception that
professional sports are in some way less serious business matters is
outdated, 28 and a close review of the Agreement and prior
arbitrations indicates that there is a claim to be made on behalf of
29
Canadian franchise owners.
At the outset, it is important to articulate the limits and purpose
of a claim based in the investment protections of the NAFTA. This
Note is not intended to suggest that such a challenge could or would
have an injunctive effect in the case of any particular franchise that
faces possible relocation. Rather, this Note envisions the addition of
the NAFTA's substantive guarantees to the regulatory context in
which municipal governments provide assistance to professional
sports franchises.
If successful, the argument requires local
governments to mind the terms of the Agreement, hopefully leveling
the playing field between franchises in the United States that receive
these benefits and franchises in Canada that do not. Additionally, it
follows that if U.S. local governments were more constrained in their
ability to provide assistance to professional sports franchises, then,
all other things being equal, Canadian franchises would be less likely
to move south.
In Part II, this Note describes the nature of the economic
relationship between local government and professional sports,
culminating in a discussion of current movements in the three
relevant leagues. 30
Part III discusses pertinent portions of the
NAFTA chapter on investment and identifies the elements of a
NAFTA claim as developed by prior arbitral proceedings. Part IV
outlines a cause of action under the chapter on investment and
considers whether the collusive features of the North American
professional sports leagues thwart an individual owner's invocation of
the substantive protections of NAFTA's Chapter 11. Finally, Part V
examines the Canadian cultural exception to the NAFTA and

30,
2000, at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/mm-award-e.pdf
[hereinafter
Metalclad Final Award].
26.
See Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, Notice of Arbitration, July
2, 1999, at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/8773.pdf.
27.
See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Interim Merits Award,
June 26, 2000, available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.caltna.nac/documents/pubdocl.
pdf [hereinafter Pope & Talbot Interim Merits Award].
28.
See Paul Sweeney, Sports Lending Looms as Big Hit, U.S. BANKER, July
1998, at 37 (quoting the director of Fleet Financial Group's Sports Lending Group as
saying "[siports business is no longer a hobby" when describing a $450 million
financing his group arranged with Major League Baseball).
29.
Id.
30.
At present, the National Hockey League (NHL), Major League Baseball
(MLB), and the National Basketball Association (NBA) have franchises in Canada.
The National Football League (NFL) does not.
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attempts to explain the failure to utilize this unique aspect of the
NAFTA despite hockey's national importance to Canadians.

II. MUNICIPAL INVESTMENT IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS FACILITIES
Professional sports facilities have evolved as much as the games
they house. During the first decade of professional baseball, the
1870s, the parks were "primitive,"31 with modern baseball historians
doubting that any single park could accommodate more than 5,000
fans.32 The enclosed ballpark actually evolved contemporaneously
with the professionalization of baseball, 33 and it evolved to serve a
few specific purposes. 34 First, an enclosed ballpark permitted only
paying ticket-holders to watch the game. 35 Second, the structures
36
themselves were intended to impress talented free-agent players.
Not surprisingly, as the earliest professional baseball leagues began
to form, such as the National Association established in 1871, owners
of enclosed parks were substantially more likely to receive
37
franchises.
Typically, franchise owners or other private entrepreneurs
owned the early ballparks, 38 but in modern professional sports this is

31.
BILL JAMES, THE BILL JAMES HISTORICAL BASEBALL ABSTRACT 13 (1985).
James notes that "to state the matter without hyperbole, the finest ballpark in the U.S.
in 1879 would today be considered inadequate for the Florida State League," which is a
member of the lowest of the three primary levels of the minor league system. Id. at 21.
32.
Id. at 12. James recalls, "if a team drew 4,000 people, it looked like an
enormous number; people would be spilling off the bleachers and standing along the
foul lines to watch the game." Id. at 21.
33.
DEAN V. BAlM, THE SPORTS STADIUM AS A MUNICIPAL INVESTMENT 1 (1994).
See also JAMES, supra note 31, at 21 (discussing the "gentlemen's clubs that had
dominated baseball in the 1850s and 1860s" who were organized but were not
professional ballplayers).
34.
BAM, supra note 33, at 1; JAMES, supra note 31, at 21. The first "enclosed
ballpark was the Capitoline Grounds, commonly known as the Union Grounds, in
Brooklyn, built in 1864 by William Cammeyer. It seated about 1,500 people on long
benches." Id.
35.
BAM, supra note 33, at 1.
36.
Id. Far from the system of long-term contracts in place in professional
sports now, the first professional baseball league, the National Association of Baseball
Players (in existence from 1871-75), "was plagued with 'revolvers,' players who jumped
from one team to another." James, supra note 31, at 10.
37.
BALM, supra note 33, at 1. Baim points out that some of the same concerns
are still very much at the heart of the stadium issue. Although no longer preoccupied
with excluding non-paying passers-by from the audience, "[tioday, one of the common
ways of demonstrating an interest in hosting a professional sports franchise is to
possess a facility in which the team can play." Id.
38.
JAMES, supra note 31, at 36 (discussing the appreciable improvement in the
ballparks of the second decade of professional baseball. James catalogs wealthy
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rarely the case. 39 Since the early 1960s, city and state governments
have contributed the vast majority of the cost of building new
stadiums and arenas. 40 The transition from private ownership to
public funding is a contentious, ongoing debate, and is the economic
phenomenon at the heart of this Note.
41

A. Modern Stadium Finance and Economics

In order to consider whether municipal assistance to professional
sports franchises creates a cause of action under the NAFTA chapter
on investment, Part II.A.1 provides a brief overview of the kinds of
assistance state and local governments in the United States are
providing or offering to provide. Part II.A.2. then briefly discusses
the empirical and normative debate surrounding the claimed returns
on municipal investment in professional sports facilities. Finally,
Part II.B. catalogues the important events in the three relevant
leagues, 4 2 with particular emphasis on the movement of NHL
franchises from Canada to the United States.
1. Stadium Finance:
Transfers
Professional Sports Franchises

from

Local

Governments

to

a. Direct Payments
The most obvious form of assistance is a cash payment to a
franchise in return for a decision to relocate. 4 3 For instance, the city
of Nashville had a standing offer of a $20 million direct payment to
any NHL or NBA team willing to relocate to Music City.4 4 In 1995,

individuals like Albert Spalding (Chicago), Alfred Reach (Philadelphia) and Henry
Lucas (St. Louis) who recognized the need for increased capacity and committed their
own resources to the construction of new ballparks, in some sense speculating on the
continued economic viability of baseball in the U.S.).
39.
BAIM, supra note 33, at 1.
40.
Id.
41.
Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist, Build the Stadium-Createthe Jobs!, in
SPORTS, JOBS AND TAXES: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND STADIUMS 6

(Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist eds., 1997). Noll and Zimbalist differentiate
between the often-conflated topics of stadium economics ("how the stadium and the
events inside it affect aggregate economic welfare") and stadium finance ("the
expenditures and revenues directly associated with building and operating the
stadium"). This Note observes this distinction in terminology.
42.
See supra note 30.
43.
MARK S. ROSENTRAUB, MAJOR LEAGUE LOSERS: THE REAL COST OF SPORTS
AND WHO'S PAYING FOR IT 120-22 (1997).

44.
Id. at 121. Rosentraub reports that the offer was intended to sweeten an
offer made to the NHL's New Jersey Devils by covering any costs associated with
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Irwindale, California-home at the time to the NFL's Raiders-gave
the franchise $10 million to stay "in the running" as a long-term
home for the Raiders while ownership mulled over the possibility of
relocating. 45 Ultimately the Raiders returned to Oakland, and
46
Irwindale never saw a return on its investment.
b. Favorable Lease Agreements
More common than outright cash payments are favorable lease
agreements structured so that the franchise owner captures most of
revenue generated by the facility. 4 7 For instance, the premiums
charged for skybox or other luxury seating create a revenue stream
that can be shared between a franchise and the governmental entity
that builds the stadium.4 8
However, the distribution of these
revenues varies from deal to deal, and in most instances, favors the
franchise. 49 For instance, the MLB's Texas Rangers' stadium is
owned by a unique unit of the Arlington, Texas government.50 In the
agreement between that city and the Rangers, the team received 115
percent of the revenue from rental of luxury suites during the first
year, 95 percent in years two through four, and 100 percent from year
five forward. 5 1 Not all such arrangements are so lopsided in favor of
the franchise. The public agency responsible for the construction of
the RCA Dome in Indianapolis, Indiana (home to the NFL's Colts)
receives $2.2 million from the rental of luxury seating, while the team
receives only $500,000.52
c. Advertising and Other Revenue
Additional revenues spring from advertising opportunities
within the stadiums, including naming rights to the facilities

moving the team or getting out of the team's existing lease. Id.

However, any money

remaining after these expenses were paid would go to the Devils' owners. Id.
45.
Id.
46.
Id.
47.
48.

Id. at 92-107.
Id. at 94.

49.
See id.
50.
Id.
51.
Id. Note that for the first year of this agreement, the Arlington government
actually made a direct payment of 15% of the total revenue from the rental of luxury
suites, 100% of which had already been captured by the Rangers. Thus, although
characterized as a lease agreement, the lease agreement created an obligation that is
indistinguishable from the direct payments discussed supra.
52.
Id.
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themselves, 53 as well as billboards and placards throughout the
buildings,5 4 some of which are even visible to viewers at home over
television. 55 As with seat licenses, the distribution of these revenues
5 6
is a significant term of negotiations between a city and a franchise.
Concessions sold at the stadium on game day also generate
significant revenues, and the split of these revenues varies from 100
percent of proceeds accruing to the franchise 57 to more egalitarian
distributions between the municipality and the franchise. 58 Similar
distributions are negotiated regarding revenues from event parking
and proceeds from use of the facility for non-sporting events such as
concerts and other exhibitions. 5 9
d. Loans and Additional Facilities
In addition to the direct payments and beneficial lease terms,
local governments may offer the home team or a relocating. team
loans to support the construction of a new facility or to defray other

53.
The point can be illustrated by reference to the teams that play in the
neighboring cities of San Francisco and Oakland, California: MLB's Giants play at
Pacific Bell Park, and the Oakland Athletics play at Network Associates Coliseum; the
NFL's 49ers play at 3Com Park; and the NHL's San Jose Sharks play at the HP
(Hewlett Packard) Pavilion. Only the NBA's Golden State Warriors play in the
unsponsored-and somewhat generically named-Arena in Oakland.
54.
For example, the aisle seat on each row in Houston's formerly-Enron Field
was emblazoned with the infamous corporation's logo. John Williams, Sign of the
Times: Exemption in '93 City Law Will Allow Enron's Name to Shine All Over
Downtown, HOUSTON CHRON., November 21, 1999, at A37.
55.
Advertising is perhaps most visible to television viewers on the outfield
walls of baseball fields and underneath the ice in hockey arenas, but is present in every
stadium and arena in some form or another. See generally ROSENTRAUB, supra note
43, at 96-97.
56.
Id. at 97.
57.
The MLB's Cleveland Indians, the NBA's Cleveland Cavaliers, and the
NFL's St. Louis Rams each retain all of the concession revenues in their new facilities.
Id. at 98.
58.
The Baltimore Orioles hand over a small percentage of revenues to the
Maryland Stadium Authority, and the NBA's Orlando Magic split the concession
receipts evenly with the City of Orlando. Id.
59.
Id. at 99-100. Rosentraub also points out that the availability to team
ownership of local television and radio broadcasting contracts, although not a term of
lease agreements, can have a profound effect on the level of public assistance sought by
the franchise. Id. at 103. Income from television and radio is generally not a part of
revenue sharing in leagues in which there are such measures, and a franchise that
realizes significant revenue in this way may demand less from the municipality in the
terms of its lease agreement. Id. Note that the converse is also true-franchises that
lack a strong revenue stream from local broadcasting will be even more dependent on a
municipality for assistance, creating a context either for dramatically expanded public
investment or franchise relocation described in Part II.B., infra.
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costs.6 0 Another fairly common offer is the construction of practice
facilities for the team to use apart from the primary facility.6 1 For
example, developers of the buildings in Cleveland that are home to
MLB's Indians and the NBA's Cavaliers built and furnished fullyfunctioning restaurants with views of the action, then handed the
restaurants over to the team owners to operate, with profits accruing
62
not to the city or to private developers but to the team ownership.
the opportunity to lease
Some new facilities even offer team owners
63
out portions of the stadium as office space.
Returns
2. Stadium Economics:
Professional Sports Franchises

on Municipal

Investment in

Expensive stadiums built with public money were originally
justified as a centerpiece of economic development.6 4 Every new job
created by the team and the stadium-from the construction of the
facility to the sale of beer in its aisles-has a stimulating economic
effect.6 5 So long as these developments do not simply displace some
other type of construction or employment that would have occurred
anyway, these jobs are a net benefit to a municipality. 66 There are
also a variety of tax revenues available to the municipality as a result
of stadium construction that help defray the stadium's costs. 67 For
example, additional taxes may be levied by a municipality on
attendees at the sporting event-a revenue stream clearly not
available prior to construction.6 8 Similarly, taxes paid by individuals
who, without a professional sporting event to attend, would have gone
to the movies or some other attraction outside city limits, are a new
69
source of revenue for a municipality.

60.
Id. at 104.
61.
See id.
Id. at 121.
62.
Id. at 103-04.
63.
64.
See Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 41, at 6. The leading examples of
stadiums as economic development remain Camden Yards in Baltimore, Maryland and
Jacobs Field in Cleveland, Ohio. For a full accounting of the economic costs and
benefits associated with these stadiums, see Bruce W. Hamilton & Peter Kahn,
Baltimore's Camden Yards Ballpark, and Ziona Austrian & Mark S. Rosentraub,
Cleveland's Gateway to the Future, in SPORTS, JOBS AND TAXES, supra note 41.
BAlM, supra note 33, at 4.
65.
66.
Id.
Id.
67.
68.
Id.
69.
Id. Baim notes that "[t]ypical errors" in assessing the benefits of new
construction include the assumption that "everyone who attends a sporting event
would have spent their money outside the city limits if the stadium is not built." Id.
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But to whatever extent the cost to local government exceeds the
total of these new revenues, there will still be a subsidy of
professional sports by the municipality, and most economic research
suggests that subsidies are common because economic development
70
and tax revenues have not increased as typically projected.
Economists Roger Noll and Andrew Zimbalist suggest that this is
primarily because standard methods of evaluating economic impact of
professional sports facilities overestimate both the new business
created by a franchise and the indirect benefits that result from the
new business. 71 Although new stadiums may create some new
employment, economists point out that public investment in
professional sports is an "ineffective and costly" means of job
creation. 72 And because a substantial portion of the gains to be
realized from the operation of a professional sports facility go to
players, managers, coaches, and executives, public subsidization
works a regressive redistribution of income from taxpayers to these
wealthy individuals. 73 Thus, subsidies from local governments to
professional sports franchises raise thorny normative issues

He suggests that this mistake often leads to overestimation of the economic benefits of
a new facility. Id.
For a thorough review of the last decade of empirical analysis refuting
70.
assertions about "economic growth, job creation and increased tax revenue," see Smith,
supra note 18, at 48-49. In addition to a thorough literature review, Smith conducts
his own empirical analysis concluding that "increasing the percentage of a new
stadium financed with public funds" did not lead to improvements in "individual
wealth, crime and unemployment rates." Id. at 58. On the contrary, Smith found that
the increase in public funds actually led to a decline in the variable used to track
economic growth. Id.; see also Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 41, at 30.
[F]or the most part, an industry as localized as a sports team is not likely to
generate much local economic development, especially in an entire
metropolitan area rather than a city within that area. Stadium subsidies
facilitate building expensive monuments to sports that benefit no one and
transfer income from ordinary people to highly paid players, owners and
executives.
Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 41. See also Robert A. Baade & Allen R. Sanderson, The
Employment Effects of Teams and Sports Facilities,in SPORTS, JOBS AND TAXES, supra
note 41, at 112 (indicating that "the results of this study do not support a positive
correlation between professional sports and job creation. This finding suggests that
professional sports realign economic activity within a city's leisure industry rather
than adding to it.").
71.
Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist, Economic Impact of Sports Teams and
Facilities,in SPORTS, JOBS AND TAXES, supra note 41, at 87.
72.
Baade & Sanderson, supranote 70, at 112.
73.
Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 71, at 87.
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completely apart from whether these transfers violate the investment
74
rules of the NAFTA.
B. Overview of Relevant Events in the ProfessionalSports Leagues
During the 1990s, thanks mostly to the expansion of the four
major professional leagues-Major League Baseball (MLB), the
National Basketball Association (NBA), and the National Hockey
League (NHL)-and "agitation" by existing franchises, 21 new
stadiums and 30 arenas were erected. 75 Many of these facilities
relied in some way on public funding. Part II.B. is a brief overview of
the relevant events in the three professional sports leagues where
local government played a role in the development of new facilities.
Of particular importance to this Note is the relationship between
offers of public assistance by U.S. cities and the relocation of NHL
teams from Canada to the United States.

74.
Noll and Zimbalist suggest that the "consumer benefits presumably are the
real reason that cities are willing to spend so much on attracting and keeping a team,"
but that these consumer benefits are difficult to quantify and rarely incorporated into
the economic analysis. Id. at 87. In fact, the primary justification for continued public
contribution to new facilities is based on the extent to which "beneficiaries are more
likely to be 'consuming' this 'good' in a myriad of indirect ways." See Allen R.
Sanderson, Sports Facilitiesand Development: In Defense of New Sports Stadiums,
Ballparks and Arenas, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L. J. 173, 187-90 (2000). Viewed in this way,
it is possible that sports facilities are public goods that might justify municipal
investment in a new facility. Id. However, the public goods rationale justifies only an
"efficient, well-informed decision on the part of a municipal government to provide
subventions to a team owner or professional sports league." Id. at 190. As such, the
theory of public goods is inappropriate as a broad and undifferentiated justification for
uneconomic public projects.
75.
Richard Sandomir, Stadium Building Boom Bypasses New York, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 17, 2001, at Al.
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1. Major League Baseball (MLB)
Baltimore's Camden Yards, home to the Baltimore Orioles, was
widely considered to be the model of the modern stadium, with its fan
amenities, 76 single-purpose use, 77 and its revenue-generating
skyboxes and luxury seating.78 Camden is also, however, an early
example of public investment by local government to prevent the
emigration of a beloved sports franchise. 79 It is reported that the
project became a reality because of the combined effect of the team
owner's unwillingness to sign a long-term lease in the team's former
facility, and the 1984 departure of the city's NFL franchise, the

76.
Modern stadiums offer patrons significantly more entertainment options
than just the game on the field. Many if not most stadiums now feature some sort of
restaurant with a view of the game, and Toronto's Sky Dome boasts a hotel high above
center field with windows overlooking the diamond. Joe Lapointe, They Built a Dome,
and the All-Stars Will Come, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1991, § 8, at 3. Bank One Ballpark in
Arizona features a swimming pool just beyond the center field fence, which can be
rented by small groups. Dave Anderson, Take Me Out to the Ballgame (With a
Swimming Pool), N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2001, at S3. Thanks to greatly expanded
concessions for food and souvenirs, the new stadiums have been dubbed "mallparks."
See Blair Kamin, Home Field Advantage, CHI. TRIB., July 22, 2001, at C1.
77.
Dedication to a single purpose is a major element of the push for new
facilities. The wave of publicly-funded construction that passed over North America in
the 1960s largely resulted in the creation of multi-purpose facilities that housed both
baseball and football franchises. These buildings, like the Kingdome in Seattle (home
to MLB's Mariners and the NFL's Seahawks), Three Rivers Stadium in Pittsburgh
(used by the MLB's Pirates and the NFL's Steelers), and 3COM Park-formerly known
as Candlestick Park-in San Francisco (MLB's Giants and NFL's 49ers).
The
Kingdome and Three Rivers Stadium have been demolished and replaced with
separate facilities for both of its former residents. Candlestick now hosts only the
49ers, as the Giants now play their home games at Pacific Bell Park. See Murray
Chass, Goodbye to Green Monster as a Hello to Progress?, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1995, at
B15.
78.
The availability of luxury suites and other premium seating is of
paramount importance to team owners seeking new accommodations.
See
ROSENTRAUB, supra note 43, at 92-96. Unlike the revenue from regular ticket sales,
which must be split with the visiting team as part of the leagues' revenue-sharing
policies, receipts from the rental of luxury suites and premium or "Club" seats are not
shared. Id. at 93. Camden Yards was built with 66 luxury boxes and 3,800 club seats
out of total capacity of 48,262. Id. at 95. Camden's contemporaries, Jacobs Field (with
129 Suites and 2,058 club seats out of 42,400 total) and the Ballpark at Arlington (120
Suites and 4,099 club seats out of 49,292 total) even further capitalized on this revenue
stream. Id.
79.
See Crothers, supra note 3, at 78.
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Colts. 80 Faced with the perceived threat of losing its ballclub, the
City of Baltimore financed the construction of Camden Yards. 81
This same sequence of events describes many MLB cities that
have built new stadiums in the last 15 years. With a credible threat
of relocation, often to a city that either already has built or is willing
to build,82 MLB franchises have moved into new homes at an
astounding rate. Mark Rosentraub reports that as of 1997, 12 of
MLB's franchises made threats to relocate as part of their bargaining
to obtain new facilities.8 3 Of those 12, 10 have succeeded, with the
Cincinnati Reds being the latest to move into their new ballpark on
opening day 2003.84 The notable exceptions on this list-teams that
at some point threatened relocation but have not received new
ballparks-are the New York Yankees 85 and the Montreal Expos.
The Montreal Expos play their home games in Olympic stadium,
a multi-purpose facility built primarily for the 1976 Olympic Games

80.
Id.
81.
Id. Baseball stadiums in Cleveland, Ohio and Arlington, Texas (for the
Cleveland Indians and Texas Rangers respectively), were built soon after, and appear
to have been the product of "similar threats, real or imagined." Id.
82.
Prior to receiving an expansion franchise in 1998, St. Petersburg, Florida
was the unsuccessful suitor to several MLB franchises, including the Chicago White
Sox and the Seattle Mariners, both of which ended up with new facilities in their home
cities rather than moving to the already-constructed Tropicana Field in downtown St.
Petersburg. See id.; Murray Chass, A New Field of Dreams or Just a Dream?, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 1995, at B9; Murray Chass, Some Movement in Midst of Strike: Talk
of a Rival League, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1994, at B9.
83.
ROSENTRAUB, supranote 43, at 19.
84.
John Fay, Changes on Deck for Reds Opener: Later Start, National
Audience, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Jan. 4, 2003, at lA. See also ROSENTRAUB, supra
note 43, at 19. The nine teams that have already moved in to their new homes are the
Chicago White Sox, the Cleveland Indians, the Detroit Tigers, the Houston Astros, the
Milwaukee Brewers, the Pittsburgh Pirates, the San Francisco Giants, the Seattle
Mariners, and the Texas Rangers. Id. Of these, San Francisco's PacBell Park is an
important exception because it was almost entirely privately funded after the residents
of that city repeatedly voted down referendums for public financing. See Financing
New Stadiums, supra note 19.
85.
Yankees owner George Steinbrenner has been in negotiations with the New
York City government regarding the possibility of a new stadium since the mid-1980s,
considering, alternatively, the west side of Manhattan, new construction in the Bronx
(where the stadium is presently located), and a move to New Jersey. Sandomir, supra
note 75; Charles V. Bagli, Mets and Yankees Asking State for $300 Million in Transit
Work, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2001, at B1. In his well-documented enthusiasm for
baseball, and the Yankees in particular, former Mayor of New York City Rudolph
Guiliani obtained preliminary approval for new stadiums for both the Yankees and the
city's other MLB franchise, the New York Mets. Id. This proposal was quickly scuttled
by New York's new mayor, Michael Bloomberg. Diane Cardwell, Mayor Calls Budget
Too Tight for New Stadiums and Other Construction, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2002, at B5.
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and costing more than Can. $1 billion to construct. 86 The stadium's
most prominent (and expensive) feature is what was intended to be a
retractable roof, allowing the Expos to play outside in good weather
and inside in bad weather.8 7 But the roof was not ready for the
building's opening in 1976-in fact, Olympic Stadium's roof was not
retractable until 1988, some 12 years later. 88 Worse yet, the system
only functioned for three seasons, and every Expos' home game since
1992 has been indoors.8 9 Too expensive to replace or repair, "the
stadium's most imposing or defining element is a symbol of failure." 90
It is not surprising that the Province of Quebec was, and continues to
be, hesitant to make additional commitments to support professional
sports franchises in baseball and other sports while continuing to pay
for Olympic Stadium nearly 30 years after it was built. 91
The lack of a modern facility, 92 a television contract, 93 any
significant fan support, 94 or the possibility of generating a profit in
Montreal led Major League Baseball in the fall of 2001 to vote to
contract two franchises, one of them presumably being the Expos. 95
Later that offseason, the owners of MLB franchises that collectively
comprise the league itself decided that contraction for the 2002
season was not feasible. 9 6 To accommodate the business interests of

86.
Robert Whelan & Mark S. Rosentraub, Sports and Economic Development
North of the Border: Baseball Subsidies with a CanadianFlavor and a French Accent,
in MAJOR LEAGUE LOSERS: THE REAL COST OF SPORTS AND WHO'S PAYING FOR IT 32122 (Mark S. Rosentraub ed., 1997). Even controlling for the exchange rate between the
United States and Canada, Olympic Stadium was the most expensive on record. Id.
Sadly, Toronto's Skydome is just behind Olympic Stadium as the second most
expensive facility, costing the city and the province of Ontario more than $625 million.
Id.
87.
Id. at 338.
88.
Id.
89.
Id. at 338-39.
90.
Id. at 339.
91.
Id. at 339-40.
Some commentators wonder why, despite its glaring failures, there is any
92.
need to replace Olympic Stadium. Id. at 340 (discussing the useful aspects of the
structure). Those who support the continued existence of Major League Baseball in
Montreal argue that a new facility is necessary. See Michel C. Auger, Montreal's Field
of Dreams, TORONTO SUN, May 26, 2000, at Editorial/Opinion 16.
93.
The Expos are the only MLB team without a television contract for the local
and regional broadcast of its games. Auger, supra note 92, at 16.
94.
The Expos 2001 attendance of 619,451 was less than half the attendance of
the next worst club in Major League Baseball. Murray Chass, Baseball Won't Drop
Teams in 2002, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2002, at D1.
Id. Major League Baseball never officially announced its intention to
95.
contract the Expos, but most observers were convinced that, as the team with the
lowest revenue, Montreal's team was the primary target of the contraction process. Id.
96.
Contraction in 2002 was halted in part by an injunction issued by the
Minnesota Supreme Court that ordered that the Twins must at least play out their
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Expos ownership-which desired to sell its interest in Montreal and
purchase a different franchise 97-and to make a less cumbersome
transition to contraction or relocation, the league purchased the
Montreal franchise in 2002 and remains at the helm for the 2003
season. 98 MLB's departure from Montreal seems imminent, 99 as the
franchise has been unable to secure funding for a new stadium that
would produce the revenue necessary to make it profitable. 10 0
2. National Basketball Association (NBA)
The NBA expanded into Canada with franchises in Toronto, the
Raptors, and in Vancouver, the Grizzlies. 10 1 From roughly the same
beginnings, the franchises have charted dramatically different
courses. 10 2 The handwriting may have been on the wall when the

lease with the Hubert H. Humphrey Metrodome, which ran through the end of the
2002 season. See Metro. Sports Facilities Comm'n v. Minnesota Twins P'ship, 638
N.W.2d 214, 229-30 (Minn. 2002) (affirming lower court's injunction requiring the
Twins to play out the 2002 season).
97.
Expos Get Four Years of New Life, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2002, at D2.
98.
Id. This is an unorthodox transaction, presenting serious concerns for onfield competitiveness. See Derek Zumsteg, Marooning Montreal, at http://www.baseball
prospectus.com/news/20011227daily.html. The arrangement also has implications on the
thesis here advanced-namely, if the franchises do not compete meaningfully, evidenced
by the fact that the Canadian franchise can, even for a time, come to be owned by a
consortium of its "competitors," it is not clear that NAFrA's trade regulations can be
reasonably applied to the subsidy of baseball franchises by local government in the
United States. Note, however, that the application of the investment principles to
municipal subsidies and benefits to NHL and NBA franchises is not similarly burdened.
99.
Although the Expos were not contracted after the 2002 season, MLB is still
in control of the team, and rather than play all its home games in Montreal in 2003,
the team will host 22 games in San Jan, Puerto Rico. Murray Chass, San Juan
Approved for Expos' Home Games, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2002, at D7. Many believe this
decision is a prelude to moving the team, and that Portland, Oregon, Washington D.C.,
and Northern Virginia are the primary suitors. Virginia'sPlan: Team, Then Stadium,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2003, at D7. However, under the terms of the 2002 collective
bargaining agreement between the league and the players' association, there can be no
contraction before the 2007 season. Expos Get Four Years of New Life, supranote 97.
100.
The Montreal Expos took in only $6.4 million in ticket sales, $536,000 in
media and marketing revenue, and other income of only $2.8 million. Richard
Sandomir, Dodgers Lost $69 Million, Selig Says, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2001, at S1. By
MLB's calculations, the Expos lost $10 million in 2001 even after receiving a $28.5
million revenue-sharing check from the league. Id.
101.
Clifton Brown, Now Playing in the N.B.A., the Raptors and the Grizzlies,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1995, at B13. The Canadian franchises played their first games in
1995. Id.
102.
Thanks in large part to the play and personality of the team's star, Vince
Carter, the fan support he has attracted, and the luxury of a relatively new, incomegenerating facility in Toronto, the Raptors are among the league's most successful and
popular franchises. See Harvey Araton, Grizzlies' Relocation Reveals N.B.A. 's Fault
Lines, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2001, at Bl.
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Grizzlies' first draft pick in 1999, Steve Francis, an outstanding
guard from the University of Maryland, refused to play for the
Canadian franchise and forced a trade before ever stepping foot on
the professional hardwood. 10 3
Two years later, the franchise
sardonically referred to on late-night sports television programs as
"the Grizzle" relocated to Memphis, Tennessee, but not before
competition among Memphis, New Orleans, and Louisville drove
Memphis' offer up to $250 million in new construction and other
benefits. 10 4
The generosity of the offer reflected the city
administration's belief that having a professional sports franchise
would enhance the town's prestige. 105
However, subsequent to the NBA's approval of the Grizzlies'
planned relocation to Memphis, disgruntled taxpayers in that city
filed suit under the state constitution to prevent the city from using
public funds to build a new arena for the franchise without a public
referendum on the subject.' 0 6 The taxpayers' claim succeeded at the
Chancery Court but was overturned by the Western Section of the
Tennessee Court of Appeals.' 0 7 Plaintiffs appealed the decision but
the Tennessee Supreme Court refused to hear the case, clearing the
08
way for public financing without a referendum.
3. National Hockey League (NHL)
Hockey is a far more significant part of Canadian cultural life
than baseball or basketball. 10 9 "Hockey is our game," one columnist
writes, adding that it's "much more than that, it's part of our

103.
William C. Rhoden, Francis Works Hard to Remake His Image, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 14, 2000, at D4.
104.
Worth Repeating, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Nov. 1, 2001, at G18;
Josh Peter, FinancialNumbers Grizzly for N.O., NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Apr.
15, 2001, at Sports 4.
105.
Milan Simonich, Teams Squeeze Cities to FinanceNew Arenas; But in Some
Places, Officials Have Squeezed Back, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 26, 2001, at
Al. Gale Jones Carson, executive assistant to Memphis Mayor Willie Herenton, told
reporters before the Grizzlies' move that "there are no major league teams here, and we
are the eighteenth largest city in the country. Getting an NBA team would be another
amenity to the city that would benefit us over a long period." Id. Compare this
reasoning to Jerry Colangelo's business-oriented strategy in purchasing the Winnipeg
Jets and relocating them in Phoenix, Arizona, infra notes 140-42 and accompanying
text.
106.
Memphis May Need a Referendum, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2001, at D7.
107.
Ragsdale v. City of Memphis, 70 S.W.3d 56, 74 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)
(dissolving the injunction issued by the Chancery Court).
108.
See Tedra DeSue, Legal Victory for Memphis Arena Sets Stage for PreSpring Bond Sale, BOND BUYER, Dec. 14, 2001, at 40.
109.
Kate Zernike, A Nation Worries and Waits for Gold: Canada Seeks End to
Hockey Drought, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2002, at D1.
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history...."110 Canadian playwright Rick Salutin wrote that hockey
was "the sole assurance we have a culture.""' Similar attestations
abound, suggesting that if any professional sport has a future in
Canada, it is professional hockey. Wayne Gretzky, (arguably the
game's greatest player, now an NHL franchise owner and a Canadian

national) has even assured Canadians that they "should feel safe in
112
that hockey will always be a Canadian sport."
Despite what would appear to constitute widespread civic
dedication to the game as a part of the nation's heritage, there has
been significant movement of NHL franchises from Canada to the
United States since the middle of the last decade, as two of the eight
teams that called Canada home in 1990 now play in the United
States."13 The six remaining Canadian teams play on, but they suffer

4
under tax burdens that are simply not comparable to U.S. teams."
For example, between 1991 and 1999 the Ottawa Senators franchise
paid more than Can. $160 million to the provincial and federal
governments in Canada. 115 The franchise paid Can. $36.6 million in
l 6
taxes in 1998 while total ticket revenue was Can. $34 million."

Additionally, property taxes on the $200 million, privately-financed
Canadian Corel Centre in which the Senators play-estimated prior
to construction to be Can. $1.1 million annually--climbed to Can.
$4.5 million in 1999.117 The Province of Ontario levies an additional
"amusement tax" on franchises of an additional Can. $3 million,1 18

110.
Michel C. Auger, To Hab and to Hold, OTTAWA SUN, June 30, 2000, at
Comment 15.
111.
Michael Farber, Giant Sucking Sound:
That's the Noise Distraught
Canadian Hockey Fans Hear as their Game Heads South, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar.
20, 1995, at 104.
112.
Id. Although it might give the reader some pause to note that Wayne
Gretzky, "The Great One" himself, has an ownership interest in not only a U.S.
franchise (the Phoenix Coyotes), but that this franchise was formerly known as the
Jets, played its home games in Winnipeg, and left that small Canadian market when
the city and province were unable to match the financial opportunities available in U.S.
cities like Phoenix, Arizona. See Jason Diamos, Gretzky Era Begins in Phoenix, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 16, 2001, at D7.
113.
Relocating recently have been the Winnipeg Jets (becoming the Phoenix
Coyotes) and the Quebec Nordiques (becoming the Colorado Avalanche). Sandomir,
supranote 1.
114.
Calgary and Edmonton have both refurbished their arenas and Montreal,
Ottawa, and Vancouver all moved into new buildings by the end of 1996. Farber, supra
note 111.
115.
Don Brennan, Tax Breaks for Senators? Owner to Sell Unless Feds Make
Concessions, OTTAWA SUN, Apr. 29, 1999, at Supplement 9.
116.
Id.
117.
Id.
118.
Id.
Interestingly, the "amusement" tax only applies to the Senators
because some portion of the performers in professional ice hockey-the players on the
Senators and opposing teams-are not Canadian nationals. Id. Musical performances
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and the team pays out Can. $2.5 million annually to cover the cost of
a public highway interchange constructed by the provincial
government so patrons can reach the arena conveniently.1 19 Other
accounts from the NHL (which is active in its advocacy for lower tax
rates for Canadian franchises) suggest that the Montreal Canadiens
and the Senators "each pay more in municipal taxes than all 21 U.S.
teams combined, and the tax bill for each Canadian team averages
120
four times that of a U.S. team."'
Not only do U.S. franchises pay significantly less taxes than
their Canadian counterparts, U.S. municipalities provide local
franchises with significant economic benefits. The city of Nashville,
Tennessee offered representatives from the New Jersey Devils and
the Winnipeg Jets $20 million to relocate to that city in the mid1990s. 121 In addition to the cash, Nashville offered the teams a
$750,000 annual lease on the arena it had already built with $132
million in public funds-a rental payment that would not appear to
22
cover the cost of construction during the useful life of the building.'
In addition, the City was willing to hand over all revenues from radio
and television contracts and 97.5 percent of luxury suite rental fees,
as well as other financial considerations, including generous cuts of
23
advertising and concession revenues. 1
It also came as a surprise to hockey advocates in Nashville local
government that the arena the city was building, 12 4 which is now
known as the Gaylord Entertainment Center, would be built in
violation of a local law prohibiting beer sales within 100 feet of a
church, residence, school, or park. 125 The arena's location is 85 feet
from Nashville's First Baptist Church. 126 In June of 1995, the
Nashville City Council, by a vote of 26-10, approved a bill that
exempted the arena from the ordinance, and also unanimously

and figure skating exhibitions taking place in the Corel Centre and featuring all
Canadian talent are not subject to this tax. Id.
119.
Id. This construction project is "the only privately funded, governmentowned expressway exit in Canada...." Id.
120.
Alexander, supra note 4.
121.

ROSENTRAUB, supra note 43, at 135.

122.
Id. at 136 (reporting the details of the lease agreement and a total
construction cost of $120 million to the City of Nashville); Richard Sandomir, 1995
N.H.L. Playoffs; Devils Reject Offer on New Lease, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1995, at B17
(reporting the total construction cost to be $132 million).
123.
ROSENTRAUB, supranote 43, at 136.
124.
Nashville built an arena in preparation for the acquisition of a team by
relocation or by expansion-but the construction was underway with no tenant to
speak of. Richard Sandomir, Devils on Ice? Is it a Country Band?, N.Y. TIMES, June 5,
1995, at C4.
125.
Sandomir, supra note 122.
126.
Id.
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approved a second ordinance that exempted the entire downtown

commercial area. 127 Although unsuccessful in luring a franchise from
New Jersey or Winnipeg, Nashville was ultimately rewarded for its

generosity with an expansion franchise, the NHL's Predators, in
1997.128
Nashville wasn't the only suitor for the Canadian hockey
franchises, however. Denver, Colorado became the new home of the
Quebec Nordiques in 1995 after the franchise had been a fixture in
Quebec City, Quebec for more than 20 years. 129 Earlier that year, the
Nordique ownership claimed that the team's departure could be
prevented only by the construction of a new facility, proposed to be
funded by the proceeds from a government-run casino, as well as a

commitment by the province to help defray future losses. 130

But

Canadian politicians were unable to sustain the negotiations under a

13 1
tight budget and increasingly negative public opinion.

Once in Denver, the team began to heal financially. 132 The
team's arena in Quebec City was built in 1949 and lacked the luxury
boxes that are profit centers for the franchises. 133 Nichols Arena in

Denver, which the former Nordiques, now the Colorado Avalanche,
shared with the NBA's Denver Nuggets until the Pepsi Center could
be built, already had these luxury boxes and, perhaps more
importantly, persons and corporations ready and willing to pay for

them.

134

127.
Id. The exemption of the entire downtown commercial area likely garnered
the support of the unanimous city council because it appeared to be a less arbitrary
measure than simply exempting the Gaylord Entertainment Center from operation of
the ordinance.
128.
N.H.L. Names 4 Cities for its New Franchises, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1997,
at B13.
129.
Lars Anderson, The Climb to the Top, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 20, 2001,
at 10.
130.
Bernard Simon, Canada Ice-Hockey Malaise Brings a Political Headache,
FIN. TIMES, May 20, 1995, at 3.
131.
Id.
Former President of the Nordiques, Marcel Aubut, reported that
moments before signing the agreement that transferred ownership and location of the
Nordiques, he telephoned the Quebec Premier Jacques Parizeau to make one last plea
for assistance that would allow the team to stay in Canada. Parizeau was unable to
respond in the affirmative, and Aubut said, 'Mr. Prime Minister, you've just lost a
hockey team." Id. See also Anderson, supranote 129.
132.
See Anderson, supra note 129.
133.
Id.
134.
Id. The team's then-President, Marcel Aubut, said,
We needed a new building that had luxury boxes, and we needed the
corporations to fill them. But there just weren't enough corporations. When
we looked into getting a new building [in Quebec City], we found we could fill
ten luxury boxes. But we needed seventy-five. We were sixty-five short. Then
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The Winnipeg Jets franchise also relocated from its Canadian
home to warmer climes in Phoenix, Arizona. 135 Despite valiant
efforts on the part of citizens of Winnipeg to "Save Our Jets,' 136 the
Jets left town citing the inability to be profitable and stay competitive
without a new arena that generated revenue through luxury seating
and modern concessions. 137 Jets ownership considered Minneapolis
for its new home, but city and state legislators balked at the team's
request for $20 million in improvements to the St. Paul Civic Center
where the Jets were slated to play, and were unwilling to make
significant concessions for the Jets to share Minneapolis' Target
Center with the NBA's Timberwolves. 138 Ultimately the franchise
landed in Phoenix, Arizona, both because the move lacked this
"political element," 13 9 and because of the seamlessness of the
transaction offered by Arizona investor Jerry Colangelo. 140
Colangelo, who also owns part of the NBA's Phoenix Suns and MLB's
Arizona Diamondbacks, put the deal together in about two weeks,
and slotted the Jets into the already built and functional America
West Arena. 14 1 Hardly the political handwringing of its flirtation
with Minneapolis, Colangelo's offer to the Jets was a purely economic
proposition-bringing the NHL to Phoenix meant that there were an
additional 40 days each year that the arena (of which he is manager)
would be in use. 142

you look at Denver. They sold out all of their ninety-five suites before they
even put the shovel in the Pepsi Center dirt.
Id. Quebec City was the smallest by population of all North American cities with NHL
franchises. Farber, supra note 111.
135.
Sandomir, supra note 1.
136.
The initials "SOJ" were "spray-painted on walls and etched into telephone
poles" all over Winnipeg in the months leading up to the Jets relocation. Dejan
Kovacevic, Winnipeg Out in the Cold without Jets, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, April
28, 1996, at D1. More substantively, citizen groups raised $13 million to put toward
the purchase of the franchise through events like a gathering of 35,000 fans in front of
Manitoba's legislature, the largest such rally in that province in half a century. Id.
137.
Houston & Shoalts, supra note 1.
138.
Jay Weiner, Jets' Final Destination: Phoenix, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB.,
December 5, 1995, at 1A. Some observers believed that local politicians in the
Minneapolis area "were operating under the impression [that] the Jets had no choice
but to move there," and this perception of having a strong negotiation position led them
to refuse to agree to plans that required significant public investment. Strachan, supra
note 19.
139.
Weiner, supra note 138.
140.
Richard Alm, Valley of the Suns' King, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 23,
1996, at 13B.
141.
Id.
142.
Id. Colangelo told reporters, "Here's how I look at hockey: It's good
business." Id. Colangelo is also on record as opposing the process by which franchises
shop themselves to a number of cities in search of the best package. "I'm totally
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All of this leads to an inevitable question about the future of the
NHL in Canada, particularly its smaller remaining markets.
Although NHL officials remain positive about the future of Canadian
hockey, 143 the trend is irrefutably southward. 144 The remaining
franchises may have structural advantages that simply weren't
available in Quebec City and Winnipeg (new or refurbished arenas,
larger base of wealthy individuals and corporations to purchase
luxury seating, etc.), but as long as there are cities like Nashvillewilling, for the sake of civic pride, to make troubled franchises an
offer they can hardly refuse-the same concerns are likely to arise
time and again.

III.

REGULATION OF INVESTMENT UNDER THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT

A. Basic Elements of a Claim under the NAFTA Chapter 11
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA or
Agreement), 14 5 effective January 1, 1994, is an agreement between
Canada, Mexico, and the United States mandating free trade in
goods. 146 In order "to achieve the benefits of economic liberalization,"
the NAFTA addresses "investment barriers as comprehensively as [it
addresses] trade barriers."'1 47 The rules governing investment are set
out in Chapter 11 of the Agreement. 148 The following discussion
summarizes the aspects of Chapter 11 that would be crucial to

against carpetbagging," he said. "If it's simply a matter of who can pay the highest
price, that's an abomination." Id.
NHL President Gary Bettman has remarked, "We're the national sport of
143.
Canada, not the national sport of the U.S. No matter how large we grow, we won't turn
our back on our roots. And our roots are up in Canada." And that "the issue is a wellrun NHL, not Canada versus the U.S." Farber, supra note 111. But when the
Canadian government opted not to provide even modest subsidies to its remaining
franchises in 2000 as a result of overwhelming popular opposition to the proposal,
Bettman said "We as a league will do everything we can to keep the six teams in
This is a
Canada and keep them competitive. [But] I'm not as optimistic today ....
point where we have to step back and almost on a club-by-club basis reassess and
decide what we have to do and if the club has a viable future." Steven Pearlstein,
Canada'sSubsidy Plan Put on Ice, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2000, at Dl.
144.
Id.
145.
North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-17, 1992, 31 U.S.T. 4919, 32
I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
146.
Daniel M. Price, An Overview of the NAFTA Investment Chapter:
Substantive Rules and Investor-StateDispute Settlement, 27 INT'L L. 727, 727 (1993).
147.
Id.
148.
NAFTA ch. 11.
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making out a claim under the NAFTA on behalf of Canadian sports
franchises.
The Investment Chapter has three goals: (1) to stabilize and
secure the "investment environment" by creating "clear rules of fair
treatment of foreign investment and investors"; (2) to eliminate
149
existing restrictions on investment between NAFTA Parties,
thereby encouraging such investment; and (3) to provide an effective
and efficient process for the resolution of disputes that arise under
the NAFTA. 150 The Investment Chapter has broad application,
governing treatment of both "investors of another Party" as well as
"the investments of investors of another Party in the territory of the
host Party."'15 1 Put more simply, the rules apply not only to
investment by a Canadian investor within the United States, but also
to Canadian investors within Canada.
To make out a claim under the NAFTA Chapter 11, the text of
the articles and previous adjudications indicate that a claimant must
allege and prove the following five elements: 152 (1) the claimant must
be an "investor" within the meaning provided by the Article; (2) the
claim must be related to an "investment" within the meaning
provided by the Article; (3) the claimant must identify a government
"measure" affecting the investor or investment; (4) the claimant must
allege that by this measure the government has breached a
substantive guarantee of the chapter on investment; and (5) the
claimant must show a rational connection between the breach and
153
some harm suffered by the claimant.

149.
A NAFTA "Party" is any one of the nations that are signatories to the
agreement. See generally NAFTA.
150. Price, supra note 146, at 727.
151.
NAFTA art. 1101(a), (b).
152.
In addition to these elements, a plaintiff should also be aware that under
Articles 1116 and 1117, an investor may not bring a claim under Chapter 11 "if more
than three years have elapsed from the date on which the investor first acquired, or
should have first acquired, knowledge of the alleged breach and knowledge that the
investor has incurred loss or damage." NAFTA art. 1116(2). This limitation, combined
with procedural requirements requiring 90 days written notice before submitting a
claim to arbitration (Article 1119), and requiring 6 months to elapse between the claim
and the events giving rise to a claim (Article 1120(1)) may leave potential NAFTA
plaintiffs with a relatively narrow opportunity to bring a claim under Chapter 11.
153.
Todd Weiler, The Ethyl Arbitration: First of its Kind and a Harbingerof
Things to Come, 11 Am.REV. INT'L ARB. 187, 190 (2000). See also Ian A. Laird, NAFTA
Chapter 11: NAFTA Chapter11 Meets Chicken Little, 2 CHI. J. INT'LL. 223, 227 (2001)
(articulating a similar set of main requirements confronting a potential Chapter 11
plaintiff).
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1. The Claimant Must Be an "Investor"
Interestingly, the NAFTA treats "investors" and "investment"
separately in this chapter. 154 The Agreement defines an "investor of
a Party" as "a Party or a state enterprise thereof, or a national or an
enterprise of such party, that seeks to make, is making or has made
an investment." 155 Providing separate definitions for "investor" and
"investment" most directly impacts provisions such as Article 1105,
which extends a 'Minimum Standard of Treatment" only to
"investments of investors," instead of directly to "investors" as in
other articles of the chapter on investment. 156 This bifurcation, it is
thought, was a response to concerns that such a grant directly to
investors "might simply give rise to personal injury claims against
1 57
the host, government."'
2. The Claimant Must Have an "Investment"
A claimant must hold an "investment" within Chapter l's broad
definitions of these terms. 158 Article 1139 defines "investment" as:
(a) an enterprise; (b) an equity security of an enterprise; (c) a debt
security of an enterprise . . . (d) a loan to an enterprise, (e) an interest

in an enterprise that entitles the owner to share in income or profits of
the enterprise, (f) an interest in an enterprise that entitles the owner to

share in the assets of that enterprise on dissolution ...(g) real estate or
other property, tangible or intangible .. .and (h) interests arising from
the commitment of capital or other resources in the territory of a party

to economic activity in such territory, such as under (i) contracts
involving the presence of an investor's property in the territory of the
Party, including turnkey or construction contracts, or concessions, or

(ii) contracts

where

remuneration depends

production, revenues or profits of an enterprise.

substantially

on the

159

Because of the expansiveness of this definition, the agreement
explicitly provides an accounting of what is not protected as an
investment by the chapter on investment. 160 Excluded from the
definition of investment are

154.

NAFTA art. 1139.

155.
156.
157.

Id.
Id. art. 1105.
Daniel M. Price & P. Bryan Christy, III, An Overview of the NAFTA

Investment Chapter: Substantive Rules and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, in THE
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT:
A NEW FRONTIER IN INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN THE AMERICAS 173 (Judith H. Bello et al. eds., 1994).

158.
159.
160.

Price, supra note 146, at 727.
NAFTA art. 1139.
Id.
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claims to money that arise solely from commercial contracts for the sale
of goods or services by a national or enterprise in the territory of a
Party to an enterprise in the territory of another Party, or the extension
of credit in connection with a commercial transaction, such as trade
financing ... [and] any other claims to money, that do not involve the
kinds of interests set out
161

in the section defining investment.

3. There Must be a Government "Measure"
A claimant must allege that he has been harmed by "measures
adopted or maintained by a Party."'1 62 The term "measures" is used
throughout the Article to refer to the actions of a Party to the NAFTA
relating to an investor or an investment. 163 The term itself is defined
outside the Investment Chapter, in Article 201, and includes "any
law, regulation, procedure, requirement or practice."'1 64 A number of
published arbitrations have considered the type of government
actions that can be scrutinized under the protections guaranteed by
Chapter 11, with most panels articulating a broad definition of what
constitutes a government "measure" under the Agreement. 165 For
instance, arbitration panels have found that "measures" include "the
acts of judicial as well as administrative organs"'1 6 as well as the
decisions and actions of "municipal and state officials."'1 6 7 Another
panel has held that "clearly something other than a 'law,' even
something in the nature of a 'practice' which may not even amount to
68
a legal stricture, may qualify."'
4. The Measure Must Breach One of the Substantive Guarantees of
Chapter 11
The fourth element of a claim under NAFTA requires a claimant
to allege that the government measure breaches one of the

161.
Id.
162.
NAFTA art. 1101.
163.
Id.
164.
NAFTA art. 102.
165.
Todd Weiler, Substantive Law Developments in NAFTA Arbitration,
MEALEY'S INT'LARB. REP., vol. 16, no. 12, at 71.
166.
The Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States of America, Award on
Jurisdiction, Jan. 9, 2001, 47, at http://www.international-economic-law.org.
167.
Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, Final Award, Aug. 30, 2000,
73, at http://www.international-economic-law.org[Metalclad/metalclad.pdf.
168.
Ethyl Corporation v. The Government of Canada, Award on Jurisdiction,
June 24, 1998, 66, at http://www.appletonlaw.com/cases/ejurisdiction.pdf [hereinafter
Ethyl Award on Jurisdiction].
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substantive guarantees of Chapter 11.169 A Canadian franchise
owner's strongest claim is that assistance by U.S. local government
Fortunately,
violates the requirement of national treatment. 170
previous arbitrations have created a useful, albeit limited,
And although lacking the
"jurisprudence of the NAFTA.' 171
precedential force of U.S. judicial decision-making, commentators
suggest that the "substantive provisions of NAFTA Chapter 11 are
being interpreted in a conservative and thoughtful manner," making
172
them a useful authority in the development of this cause of action.
Described as the "fundamental obligation" of the Chapter of
Investment, the national treatment requirement ensures that "a
Party may not subject enterprises to different or more onerous

operating conditions simply by virtue of foreign ownership.'

73

Article 1102(1) states, "Each Party shall accord to investors of
another, Party treatment no less favorable than it accords, in like
to the
to its own investors, with respect
circumstances,

establishment,

acquisition,

expansion,

management,

conduct,

' 174
Article
operation and sale or other disposition of investments.
1102(2) provides identical protection, except it refers to "investments
of investors" rather than "investments. 175 Finally, Article 1102(3)
describes the obligations of "sub-national" authorities (state and
provincial governments), and provides the relevant basis of
comparison in that context:

The treatment accorded by a Party under paragraphs 1 and 2 means,
with respect to a state or province, treatment no less favorable than the
most favorable treatment accorded, in like circumstances, by that state
or province to investors, and to the investments of investors, or the
1 76
Party of which it forms a part.

A number of published arbitrations have examined the contours
of the national treatment requirement in the context of the NAFTA
chapter on investment. In S.D. Myers, Inc. v.Government of Canada,

Weiler, supra note 165, at 72.
169.
NAFTA art. 1102. Although this Note focuses on the violation of the
170.
principle of national treatment, Appleton and Neceski have also advanced the
proposition that U.S. local governments violate Article 1106's prohibition on
performance requirements when public assistance is contingent upon the requirement
that the franchise play its games in a local arena. See Appleton & Neceski, supra note
16, at 9-14. Under Article 1106, NAFTA Parties may not require an investor to use
goods or services produced within its territory. NAFTA art. 1106.
Weiler, supra note 165, at 83.
171.
172.
Id.
173.
Price & Christy, supra note 157, at 174.
NAFTA art. 1102(1).
174.
Id. art. 1102(2). For the distinction between "investments" and "investors"
175.
under Chapter 11, see supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
Id. art. 1102(3).
176.
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an Ohio firm specializing in the removal and destruction of the
hazardous waste polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) from oil and
industrial equipment sought recovery for actions by Canadian
officials that prevented the export of these wastes out of Canada to
the Myers facility. 177 The arbitration revealed that the decision to
close the border to these wastes and thereby prevent Myers from
doing business with Canadian PCB producers was the result of
intense lobbying by Canadian PCB disposal firms, 178 the most
prominent of which was located in northern Alberta, several
thousand miles farther from most of the PCB waste producers than
the Myers operation in Ohio. 179 The proximity of the Myers facility to
the Canadian waste producers gave the U.S. firm "a significant cost
1 80
advantage" against both its Canadian and other U.S. competitors.
Myers brought a complaint under NAFTA Chapter 11, alleging,
inter alia, that the Canadian measure violated the standard of
national treatment.18 1 The tribunal first considered whether Myers
was "in like circumstances" as the Canadian investors who were
favored by this measure.1 8 2 The tribunal reasoned that
[t]he interpretation of the phrase "like circumstances" in Article 1102
must take into account the general principles that emerge from the
legal context of the NAFTA, including both its concern with the
environment and the need to avoid trade distortions that are not
justified by environmental concerns.
The assessment of "like
circumstances" must also take into account circumstances that would
justify governmental regulations that treat them differently in order to
protect the public interest. The concept of 'like circumstances" invites
an examination of whether a non-national investor complaining of less
favourable treatment is in the same "sector" as the national investor.
The Tribunal takes the view that the word "sector" has a wide
connotation that includes the concepts of "economic sector" and
183
"business sector."

Next, the Myers tribunal considered whether the measure had
"protectionist motive or intent"-that is, "whether the practical effect
of the measure is to create a disproportionate benefit for nationals

177.
S.D. Myers v. Gov't of Canada, Final Merits Award, Nov. 13, 2000,
9193, 123, at http://www.appletonlaw.com/casesMyers%20-%2OFinal%2OMerits%20
Award.pdf [hereinafter Myers Final Award].

178.
179.

Id.
Id.

180.

Id.

181.

Id.

122.
112.
238.

182.
Id.
243-51.
183.
Id.
250. At least one commentator has likened this step of the analysis
for national treatment to "defin[ing] the relevant market." Weiler, supra note 165, at
78. The search for the relevant market suggests that a plaintiff under Chapter 11
must be a participant in a competitive market along with the investor receiving better
treatment.
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over non-nationals," and "whether the measure, on its face, appears
to favour nationals over non-nationals who are protected by the
treaty."18 4 The tribunal found that although it may have been a
"legitimate" goal of the Canadian government to support the
continued viability of this industry within Canada, its chosen
means-banning export of PCBs-was an unacceptable breach of the
requirement of national treatment.1 8 5 Thus, the S.D. Myers tribunal
seems to have applied a three-part test for national treatment where
it (1) defines the relevant market; (2) determines whether the
claimant has received treatment less favorable than a domestic
investor; and (3) seeks proof by the NAFTA party that the measure
18 6
had a reasonable policy justification.
B. The CanadianCultural Exception to the NAFTA
The Agreement does except certain industries and actions from
the liberalization requirements in Chapter 11.187 These exceptions,
located in the Annexes to the Agreement, govern "existing measures
of a

Party that derogate from the national treatment

.

.

. or

performance requirement obligations," and prevent Parties from
making these measures more restrictive than their current, or even a
more liberalized, amended form.188 The Annexes also include sectors,
such as telecommunications, fishing, and aviation that are not subject
to the provisions of the Investment Chapter.1 8 9
For present purposes, the most important exception to the
NAFTA's regulation of investment is the Cultural Industries
exemption, arising out of one of the only, and possibly the sharpest,
points of debate and disagreement between Canada and United
States in the negotiation of the several treaties to which the nations

184.

Id.

252. The tribunal observed, however, that

Intent is important, but protectionist intent is not necessarily decisive on its
own. The existence of an intent to favour nationals over non-nationals would
not give rise to a breach of Chapter 1102 of the NAFTA if the measure in
question were to produced no adverse effect on the non-national complainant.
The word "treatment" suggests that practical impact is required to produce a
breach of Article 1102, not merely a motive or intent that is in violation of
Chapter 11.
Id.

254.
185.
Id. 255.
186.
See Weiler, supra note 165, at 77-78. Weiler distills this test from the
reasoning of the panel in the Pope & Talbot arbitration, supra note 27, but it is clearly
consistent with the Myers' tribunals analysis as well.
Price & Christy, supra note 157, at 176.
187.
188.
Id.
Id.
189.
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are Parties. 190 Canada, perhaps rightly, harbors significant concern
about the "encroachment of U.S. influence and domination" through
its popular culture. 19 1 This concern often is part of the Canadian
position in negotiations over the liberalization of trade between
nations. 192 One Canadian commentator analogized that "Americans,
especially American lawyers, think culture is something that is grown
in the refrigerator. They haven't the faintest idea of the problems of
a mouse one-tenth the size of the elephant in retaining some
semblance of independent Canadian television, an independent book
industry, music industry or magazines.' 93
As a result of these concerns, the Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) exempted "cultural industries" from the operation
of the agreement. 194 The FTA defined "cultural industries" to include
printed publications, film and video, music recording, music
publishing, and broadcasting. 195 This exception was then made a
part of the NAFTA through its incorporation of this and many other
principles set forth in the FTA. 196 It is important to note, however,
that the agreement does not give the Canadian government absolute
authority to restrain trade in the protection of culturally-relevant
industries. 197 Rather, the liberalization requirements of first the FTA
and later the NAFTA simply do not apply to these industries, and the
United States is free (by express reservation) to "take unilateral
retaliatory steps when Canada harms U.S. interests through the
198
exception."'
C. Is the Chapter 11 Dispute Settlement Mechanism Constitutional?
Any analysis of Chapter 11 would be incomplete without
acknowledging the U.S. Constitutional debate regarding NAFTA's

190.
Oliver R. Goodenough, Defending the Imaginary to the Death? Free Trade,
National Identity, and Canada's Cultural Preoccupation, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
203, 203 (1998).
191.
Id.
192.
See id.
193.
Id. at 204-05 (quoting Allen Fotheringham, Free Trade? What a Joke!,
TORONTO SUN, Mar. 9, 1996, at 11).
194.
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 23, 1987, art. 2012, 102
Stat. 1851 (1988), 27 ILM 281.
195.
An Agreement to Implement the Free Trade Agreement Between Canada
and the United States, ch. 65, § 2012, 1988 S.C. 1999 (1988) (Can.).
196.
NAFTA Annex 2106.
197.
Goodenough, supra note 190, at 217.
198.
Id. at 214, 217 (noting that the United States has shown a willingness to
resolve disputes in this area under the terms of the General Agreement on Trade and
Tarriffs (GATT) and to seek adjudication of these matters before the World Trade
Organization (WTO)).
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dispute resolution scheme. Chapter 11 provides not only a set of
rules that protect foreign investment, but also grants standing to
private plaintiffs to bring claims against a Party to the agreement for
any alleged violations of the NAFTA's substantive guarantees. 199
Arbitrators, rather than international tribunals or the federal courts
of the three NAFTA Parties, hear claims under the NAFTA.2 0 0 This
structure was intended to insulate the arbitral process from the
heated internal politics of international trade, and bolster investor
20 1
confidence that claims would be judged fairly.
In both its substantive guarantees and its dispute-resolving
procedures, Chapter 11 takes the form of a typical bilateral
investment treaty (BIT), not at all uncommon to the experience of the
Parties to the NAFTA.20 2 What is unusual about the agreement is
that for the first time, developed nations "demanded of themselves
the same high standards of investment protection that they had
traditionally demanded of developing countries. 2 03
Prior to the
NAFTA, the vast majority of BITs had been between developing
countries and developed nations, and the primary beneficiaries of
those agreements have been investors from developed nations. 20 4 In
this traditional model of a BIT, nations like Canada and the United
States "simply have not had to worry that they would ever have to
defend a claim in arbitration under a BIT. 20 5
But in this new context-a BIT between developed nationsclaims by an investor against Canada or the United States are seen
as attacks on the ability of these sovereign nations and their
governmental subdivisions to exercise regulatory authority for the

199.
Charles N. Brower & Lee A. Steven, Who Then Should Judge?: Developing
the International Rule of Law Under NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 193, 195

(2001).
200.
Id.
201.
Id.
202.
Daniel M. Price, NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-State Dispute Settlement:
Frankenstein or Safety Valve, 26 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 107, *$3 (2001). Price notes that as of
2000, more than 1500 bilateral investment treaties have been signed, most of them
featuring "provisions nearly identical to those found in NAFTA Chapter 11, including
the feature of investor-state dispute settlement." Id. See also Kenneth J. Vandevelde,
The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 469 (2000)
(estimating that as of 2000, more than 1300 BITs had been negotiated, "involving more
than 160 countries in every region of the world"); Brower & Steven, supra note 199, at
194 (reporting that the United States, Canada, and Mexico, as of 2001, had negotiated
86 BITs with other nations, and that "Chapter 11 closely follows the U.S. Model BI').
203.
Price, supra note 202, at 3.
204.
Brower & Steven, supra note 199, at 194-95.
205.
Id. at 195.
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promotion of public health, safety, or welfare. 20 6 These challenges
have recently begun to take the form of expropriation claims brought
under a standard provision of BITs that prevents nations from
expropriating the investment of a foreign national without just
compensation. 20 7 Moreover, the NAFTA extends this prohibition to
"measures
[that
are]
tantamount
to
nationalization
or
20
-- language that critics claim will trigger an
expropriation"
avalanche of adjudications.2 0 9 Some commentators have also argued
that the system of arbitration mandated by Chapter 11 violates
Article III of the U.S. Constitution by deviating from "recognized
methods for exerting federal adjudicatory power," and the
Appointments Clause by delegating the appointment of arbitrators to
2 10
persons outside the U.S. federal government.
These are serious critiques, 211 but other authors caution that the
situation may not be so dire.2 12 After all, in the eight years after the
NAFTA came into force, only 16 plaintiffs brought claims under
Chapter 11, and of these, only two arbitrators decided against a Party
to the NAFTA. 213 The paucity of adjudications posing a significant
threat to national, state, or provincial sovereignty suggests to some

206.
James McIlroy, Private Investment Claims Against State and ProvincesThe Impact of NAFTA Chapter 11 on Sub-Federal Government Agencies, 27 CAN.-U.S.
L.J. 323, 324 (2001).
207.
Brower & Steven, supra note 199, at 197.
208.
Id. See also NAFTA art. 1110.
209.
Laird, supra note 153, at 225. For example, critics point to the Loewen
arbitration, in which a Canadian funeral services firm has alleged that the state
judiciary of Mississippi has, through an excessive verdict, the denial of appeal and a
coerced settlement, imposed government measures that are tantamount to
expropriation. See Loewen v. United States, Notice of Arbitration/Statement of Claim,
162, at http://www.international-economic-law.org/Loewen/ loewen.pdf
Oct. 30, 1998,
[hereinafter Loewen Statement of Claim].
210.
See Jim C. Chen, Appointments with Disaster: The Unconstitutionality of
BinationalArbitral Review Under the United States-CanadaFree Trade Agreement, 49
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1455, 1457 (1992) (examining the U.S.-Canada Free Trade
Agreement, the immediate precursor between these nations to the NAFTA, containing
similar arbitration provisions for dispute resolution).
For a thoughtful discussion of the precarious constitutional status of
211.
Chapter 11, see Steve Louthan, Note, A Brave New Lochner Era? The Constitutionality
of NAFTA Chapter 11, 34 VAND. J. TRANS'L L. 1443 (2001) (raising serious
constitutional questions about Chapter 11 under not only Article III but also the
Eleventh Amendment).
212.
See Laird, supra note 153, at 225-26 (noting that "NAFTA Chapter 11 is a
relatively limited, although powerful in the correct circumstances, legal remedy that
has not turned out to be the scourge against state sovereignty many continue to believe
it will be"); Price, supra note 202, at 9 (opining that "[c]oncerns about [Chapter 1l's]
misuse-an hysteria over its compatibility with democratic governance-are at present
without foundation").
Laird, supranote 153, at 225.
213.
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commentators that Chapter 11 may actually be "a relatively limited,
although powerful in the correct circumstances, legal remedy .... ,,214
This Note does not take a position on the constitutionality of
Chapter l's provisions for dispute resolution except so far as
required to make the positive claim that what has been enacted in the
NAFTA and in thousands of similar agreements involving the
NAFTA Parties and other nations is, for the time being, a binding
and effectual agreement between the Parties. Coming to a conclusion
about the interaction between these provisions and the sovereignty of
the Parties to the agreement is a different-and much greaterendeavor than the one on which this Note has embarked. It would
seem sufficient at this time and for these purposes to note that
Chapter 11 is not without its critics on the broadest and most
important of legal dimensions, yet its provisions remain in force.

IV. A HYPOTHETICAL CLAIM UNDER CHAPTER ELEVEN
After reviewing some representative transactions between
municipalities and professional sports franchises, 215 and considering
the relevant sections of Chapter 11,216 there is sufficient background
to consider whether Canadian franchises and the owners of Canadian
franchises can make a successful claim against some or all of the
cities and states that provide assistance to their local team or a team
relocating to their town. Part IV applies the five elements of a
NAFTA claim to the subsidization of professional sports franchises by
units of local government in the United States.
Perhaps not
surprisingly, the most contentious element is likely to be whether the
NAFTA Party has violated a substantive provision of the Investment
Chapter, in this case the requirement of national treatment.
A. ProfessionalSports FranchiseOwners are "Investors"under
Chapter 11
The NAFTA Investment Chapter applies to those measures
relating to investors of another party, defined as a "national or an
enterprise.., that seeks to make, is making or has made an
investment. ' 217 Canadian investors in franchises located in either
Canada or the United States would satisfy this definition (as would

214.

Id.

215.
216.

See supra Part II.
See supra Part III.

217.

NAFTA art. 1139.
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U.S. investors in franchises located in either the United States or
Canada if the concern were measures promulgated by Canadian
government). It is important to note, however, that some of the
professional sports franchises located in Canada are owned at least in
part by U.S. citizens, 218 who would not be entitled to relief under
Chapter 11. The definition of enterprise to include those who own
portions of an investment would probably enable the members of
ownership groups who are Canadian to bring a claim under Chapter
11.219

B. Professional Sports Franchisesare "Investments" under
Chapter 11
As noted above, the Chapter 11 definition of "investment" is a
broad one. 220 An investment in a professional sports franchise can
satisfy the definition in any one of a number of ways. Most directly,
an ownership interest in a professional sports franchise creates "an
interest in an enterprise that entitles the owner to share in income or
profits of the enterprise. '221 "Enterprise" is defined in Article 201 as
"any entity constituted or organized under applicable law, whether or
not for profit, and whether privately-owned or governmentally-owned,
including any corporation, trust, partnership, sole proprietorship,
'222
joint venture or other association.
It has also been suggested that Canadian professional sports
franchises constitute investments under Chapter 11 as "real estate or
other property, tangible or intangible, acquired in the expectation or
used for the purpose of economic benefit or other business
purposes,'223 and as
interests arising from the commitment of capital or other resources in
the territory of a Party to economic activity in such territory, such as
under (i) contracts involving the presence of an investor's property in
the territory of the Party, including turnkey or construction contracts,
or concessions, or (ii) contracts where remuneration depends
224
substantially on the production, revenues or profits of an enterprise.

218.
The Montreal Expos, for example, prior to becoming part of the portfolio of
the league itself, were majority-owned by Jeffrey Loria, a U.S. businessman. BASEBALL
PROSPECTUS 356-58 (Joe Sheehan, ed. 2002).
219.
For most of its existence, however, some of the members of the Expos
ownership group were Canadian, and these investors would appear to qualify under
the definition of "investor" set forth in Article 201. Id.
220.
See supra Part III.A.1.
NAFTA art. 1139(e).
221.
Id. art. 201.
222.
223.
Id. art. 1139(g).
224.
Id. art. 1139(h).
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Thus, professional sports franchises in Canada that are members of
leagues that operate in the United States can be considered branches
of an enterprise as a result of their participation in a league that
shares any revenue across member teams. 2 25 In addition, Canadian
franchises can be considered enterprises in their own right as a result
of their tangible and intangible property rights in the buildings and
trademarks associated with the franchise. 226
However, as will
become clear during the discussion of the national treatment claim,
an investor may prefer to emphasize the independent aspects of
professional sports franchises rather than participation in what is
essentially a joint venture.
C. Public Assistance to Sports FranchisesConstitutes a Government
"Measure"
Recent tribunals have interpreted the government measure
requirement broadly enough that it more than likely includes a
decision by a municipality to provide assistance to a professional
sports franchise. 227
Recall that the Ethyl tribunal's definition
included "something other than a 'law', even something in the nature
'228
of a 'practice' which may not even amount to a legal stricture.
Other tribunals have found measures in the decisions of domestic
courts 229 and the decisions and actions of "municipal and state
officials. '230
Therefore there is a strong likelihood that most
examples of municipal assistance to professional sports franchises
will be considered government measures under the NAFTA.
One important difference between the conduct here described
and the subjects of prior arbitration is that most cases involve
burdens placed on investors of another Party. In Ethyl, plaintiffs
sought relief from a Canadian regulation that banned the import and
interprovincial trade of a substance plaintiffs produced. 2 31
In
Metalclad, plaintiffs sought relief from post hoc requirements
imposed by a local government impeding its lawful and previously
licensed attempts to operate a waste treatment facility. 23 2 In Pope &
Talbot, plaintiffs sought relief from an export control regime that

225.
For example, the NHL pools television revenue, and MLB has an intricate
system of revenue sharing based on individual team revenue. Appleton & Neceski,
supra note 16, at 8.
226.
Id.
227.
See supra Part III.A.3.
228.
Ethyl Award on Jurisdiction, supra note 168, 6.
229.
Loewen Statement of Claim, supra note 209, 99 161-62.
230.
Metalclad Final Award, supra note 25, 99 106-07.
231.
Ethyl Award on Jurisdiction, supra note 168,
5-8
232.
Metalclad Final Award, supra note 25, 50.
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burdened the plaintiffs enterprise more severely than those located
in other provinces. 233 In SD Myers, plaintiffs sought relief from an
order by the Canadian Environment Minister that prohibited the
export of hazardous waste after plaintiffs company demonstrated an
ability to process the waste at a price significantly below that of its
Canadian competitors. 234 In Loewen, plaintiffs argued that the
decision of a Mississippi state court jury award was so significant a
burden on their investment as to amount to expropriation. 235 In each
arbitration, then, the government measure at issue has negatively
burdened a plaintiffs investment through a substantive regulation or
a procedural requirement.
Thus, the typical model of a measure that receives scrutiny
under Chapter 11 is not mere government assistance to a favored
domestic investor. Rather, most arbitrations are aimed at measures
that specifically burden a particular claimant. This lack of precedent,
although possibly disconcerting to a potential claimant, is probably
not dispositive.
Rather, a claim against such an affirmative
"measure" will likely just make more difficult a plaintiffs required
showing under the fourth and fifth elements of a Chapter 11 claimthe breach of a substantive guarantee of the chapter on investment,
and the rational connection between the breach and some harm
suffered by the plaintiff. If a claimant can make a sufficient showing
on these elements, the fact that the measure was affirmative
assistance to a competitor rather than a burden on the plaintiff
should be immaterial.
D. Does Public Assistance to Sports FranchisesViolate the
Substantive Protectionsof Chapter 11?
The title of this Section is in the form of a question because, of all
the elements, the claimant is likely to have the most trouble proving
that a NAFTA Party has violated one of the substantive protections of
Chapter 11. As suggested above, the investor's most plausible claim
is that this assistance contravenes the principle of national
treatment. This principle is intended to prevent a NAFTA Party from
burdening enterprises with "different or more onerous operating
conditions simply by virtue of foreign ownership. ' '2 36 The discussion

233.
Pope & Talbot Interim Merits Award, supra note 27,
6-7.
234.
Myers Final Award, supra note 177, 132.
235.
Loewen Statement of Claim, supra note 209, 162.
236.
Price & Christy, supra note 157, at 174. At the outset, it is also important
to note that the national treatment requirement under Article 1102 does not apply to
"subsidies or grants provided by a Party or a state enterprise, including governmentsupported loans, guarantees and insurance." NAFTA art. 1108(7)(b). However, the
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of national treatment in the context of the S.D. Myers arbitration in
Part III suggests a useful three-part test: (1) is the claimant "in like
circumstances" with the investors of the Party that the Party favored
through this measure; (2) has the claimant been treated in a way
"less favorable" than domestic investors; and (3) is there any
reasonable policy justification for the less favorable treatment of an
23 7
international investor?
1. Is the Claimant "In Like Circumstances" with Favored Domestic
Investors?
Resolution of this element requires inquiry into the unique
economic structure of professional sports in North America-one that
has confused courts 23 8 and amused economists for decades. 2 3 9 The
leagues generally "exhibit a dual financial and decision-making
structure," with clubs cooperating in some respects but competing in
others. 240 Fortunately, the question of whether member franchises of
professional sports leagues are in competition with one another is an
oft-addressed (if not well-settled) area of U.S. antitrust law, and these
decisions provide a useful framework for considering whether there
are actual competitors against whose circumstances a Canadian
claimant franchise can be compared.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that franchises of
professional sports leagues "must cooperate in a variety of ways, and

national treatment requirement specifically applies to "all taxation measures, other
than those on income," meaning that differential treatment of teams through, for
example, abatement of property taxes, would be actionable. Id. art. 2103(4)(b).
Further, a claimant might also challenge a local sales tax intended to generate revenue
for assistance to a professional sports franchise, because although the subsidy is
immunized by Article 1108(7)(b), the means of raising the funds is arguably not
protected.
237.
Weiler, supra note 165, at 77-78. See also supra Part III.A.4.
238.
See Piraino, supra note 21, at 892 (noting that "[tlhe federal courts' failure
to develop a consistent theory regarding the economic behavior of sports leagues has
prevented them from effectively regulating the leagues' abuses of monopoly power").
See Ethan Glass, Slicing the Rent-Seeking Onion: Why Differential Rent239.
Seeking Explains the Competitive Disadvantage of United States Sports Franchisesin
Canada, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 691, 691-92 (2000) (noting that "[e]conomists find
professional sports to be an interesting model upon which to test their economic
theories."
This, Glass writes, is the result of the increasing importance and
prominence of professional sports, the special positions professional sports occupy in
the law, and the strong parallel between heavily regulated professional sports and
"other international businesses in regulated or restricted industries.").
240.
James L. Brock, Jr., A Substantive Test for Sherman Act Plurality:
Applications for ProfessionalSports Leagues, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 999, 1009 (1985).
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may do so lawfully, in order to make the football league a success. ' 241
There can be no game without an opponent, no champion without an
also-ran. As a result, "many critical league decisions are made
collectively, and the economic consequences of those decisions are
'2 42
often distributed among the clubs in the form of shared revenues.
Thus, franchises should be concerned not only about the survival of
other clubs, but also that they remain economically viable and able to
compete "in order to maximize the interest of spectators and hence
revenues from the sale of the product (the joint game). '243 This
cooperative concern for other league members is evident in many
facets of league organization-mutual agreement on league rules and
procedures, systems of revenue sharing, 244 league-wide broadcasting
contracts, shared costs of operating the league organization, and so
on.245

These cooperative aspects have led some economists and courts
to conclude that members of professional sports leagues do not face
antitrust liability where it cannot be proved that they are competitors
in a particular product and geographic market. For instance, in 1983,
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that NFL franchises
competed only within "certain geographic submarkets," where league
members might "compete with one another for ticket buyers, for local
broadcast revenue, and for sale of the concession items like food and
beverages and team paraphernalia. '246 The Third Circuit explicitly
refused to find that "there can never be competition among league
members," 247 but asserted that this was precisely the conclusion
reached by the Southern District of New York in Levin v. National
Basketball Association.248 In Levin, the court held that the Sherman
Act did not apply to the NBA's refusal to allow plaintiffs to purchase
the Boston Celtics franchise because "plaintiffs wanted to join with
those unwilling to accept them, not to compete with them, but to be
partners in the operation of a sports league for plaintiffs' profit. '249

241.
Sullivan v. Nat'l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1097 (3d Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1190 (1995).
242.
Brock, supra note 240, at 1009.
243.
PETER J. SLOANE, SPORT IN THE MARKET? THE ECONOMIC CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF THE 'PACKER REVOLUTION' 15 (London; Institute of Economic Affairs

1980).
244.

Lee Goldman, Sports, Antitrust and the Single Entity Theory, 63 TUL. L.

REV. 751, 757-58 (1989).

245.
Brock, supra note 240, at 1009.
246.
Mid-South Grizzlies v. Nat'l Football League, 720 F.2d 772, 787 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215 (1984).
247.
Id. at 787 n.9.
248.
Levin v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 385 F. Supp. 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
249.
Id. at 152.
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In some instances, the leagues have claimed to be "single250
entities" incapable of conspiring with themselves to restrain trade,
and therefore not subject to liability under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act.
Section 1 prohibits only contracts, combinations, and
conspiracies between two or more firms in restraint of trade. 25 1 If the
leagues were to successfully characterize themselves as a single
entity, then agreements among franchises would not be scrutinized
under Section 1.252 This particular line of antitrust jurisprudence is
important to the present inquiry because if the leagues are singleentities, incapable of conspiring with each other for antitrust
purposes, it seems unlikely that any particular franchise could be
harmed by assistance to another franchise-municipal assistance to
one franchise could be characterized as a benefit to the entire
league.253

The U.S. Supreme Court provided a useful functional test for
determining whether an antitrust defendant shows a plurality of
economic interests in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Thbe Corp.,
holding that "the coordinated activity of a parent and its wholly
owned subsidiary must be viewed as that of a single enterprise for
purpose of [Section 1] of the Sherman Act" because "the parent and
'254
its wholly owned subsidiary have a complete unity of interest.
Several commentators suggest that when applied to the professional
sports leagues, this rule suggests that the leagues should be
considered competitors for some purposes, and collaborators for
others. 25 5 For instance, in areas where the league action "rest[s] on
joint decisions not implicating teams' independent interests,"25 6 such
as those that produce shared revenues, 2 57 the leagues should be
treated as single entities. In other areas, however, where "the
member clubs have disparate economic interests in the results of
their collective decisions," the franchises should not be considered
Therefore, the teams should be considered
single entities. 258

Chicago Profl Sports Ltd. P'ship v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 95 F.3d 593,
250.
596-97 (7th Cir. 1996)
251.
Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1997).
252.
Note that even as "single-entities," the leagues might still face antitrust
liability under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits actions by parties with
power in the relevant product and geographic markets from taking even unilateral
actions that monopolize that market. 15 U.S.C. §2 (1997).
253.
This seems particularly true when considering the resale value of
ownership interests. The mere possibility of assistance from U.S. local governments
increases the value of ownership interests and likely their resale price.
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984).
254.
Brock, supra note 240, at 1024; Goldman, supranote 244, at 795-96.
255.
Goldman, supra note 244, at 796.
256.
257.
Brock, supra note 240, at 1024.
258.
Id.
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competitors in markets for inputs like players, coaches, and other
employees, as well as for outputs like broadcasting revenue that is
not shared equally among the teams, merchandise and trademark
licensirg, and the sale of ownership interests.
Perhaps not surprisingly, then, many federal courts have found
the possibility of competition in many of these areas, relying on the
instances where franchises are independent operations that bear the
fiscal and competitive results of their own decision-making. 25 9 For
instance, the Third Circuit, in Sullivan v. NFL, called it "well
established that NFL clubs also compete with each other, both on and
off the field, for things like fan support, players, coaches, ticket sales,
26 0
local broadcast revenues and the sale of team paraphernalia.
Similarly, in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. NFL, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the lower court's
conclusion that NFL teams are "separate business entities whose
products have an independent value," 26 1 and reasoned that, "the NFL
clubs do compete with one another off the field as well as on to
acquire players coaches, and management personnel. 26 2 Finally, the
court observed that "[i]n certain areas of the country where two teams
operate in close proximity, there is also competition for fan support,
local television and local radio revenues, and media space. 263
One additional market where U.S. federal courts have found
competition between franchises in a professional sports league is in
the market for the sale of ownership interests. The Third Circuit in
Sullivan concluded that the NFL's ownership policy reduces the
available output of ownership interests. 264 The Eastern District of
Pennsylvania reached a similar conclusion, refusing to dismiss a
plaintiffs allegation that MLB "interfered directly and substantially
with competition" in the "team franchise market [the market for
ownership of professional baseball teams, and the market for
'265
ownership of the San Francisco] Giants in particular.

259.
Id. at 1009.
260.
Sullivan v. Nat'l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1098 (3d Cir. 1994).
261.
Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 726 F.2d
1381, 1389 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984) (quoting 519 F. Supp. 581,
584 (C.D. Cal. 1981)).
262.
Los Angeles Mem 7 Coliseum Comm'n, 726 F. 2d at 1390.
263.
Id.
Note that there is a reasonable argument to be made that the
geographic market for fan support, television, and media space may be significantly
larger now than at the time of the Los Angeles Coliseum decision in 1984 as a result of
the broad dissemination of sports programming through national and international
programmers that serve millions of customers throughout the continent through cable
and direct-broadcast satellite.
264.
Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1100.
265.
Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 430 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
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Thus, there is a colorable argument to be made that professional
sports franchises participate
in competitive
national and
international markets for players, coaches, television revenues, the
sale of ownership interests, and possibly other inputs and outputs.
Competition between the franchises in these markets provides the
basis for asserting that the franchises are in "like circumstances," and
therefore are entitled to the benefit of national treatment.
2. Has the Claimant been Treated Less Favorably?
The second element of the national treatment analysis requires
an examination of whether the government measure provides less
favorable treatment to the claimant than a domestic investor. A
claimant likely would argue that tax abatements and other
unprotected public assistance to a franchise creates additional
revenue with which a franchise may build a more competitive
team.2 66 A team that succeeds in competition on the field (1) nray be
more likely to succeed in the competitive market for players and
coaches; (2) almost certainly will be more successful in the market for
television revenues; and (3) likely will fetch a higher price in the
competitive market for ownership interests. Franchises disfavored
because they play their home games in Canadian cities lack this
assistance and are arguably treated less favorably than their U.S.
counterparts.
3. Is there a Reasonable Policy Justification for Less Favorable
Treatment?
The third element of the national treatment analysis allows a
NAFTA Party to prove that a reasonable policy decision justifies the
less-favorable treatment of an international investor. A NAFTA
Party confronted with such a claim might respond that the economic
development that results from stadium construction and the civic
benefit of having a professional sports franchise justify the
differential treatment. 26 7 However, economists are moving toward a
consensus that professional sports facilities simply have not

266.
The franchise may elect to improve competitiveness through the acquisition
of expensive "star" players who, even if unable to improve the team competitively, may
still draw fan interest and increase revenues at the ticket window. Note also that even
a team that is unsuccessful on the field is in a better position to obtain talented players
and coaches simply by virtue of being able to pay those employees a higher salary
thanks to government assistance.
267.
This is a common justification for public spending in the area of
professional sports. See supra Part II.
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generated the kinds of economic returns that were projected by their
proponents. 268 One commentator recently concluded that "despite a
series of studies over the past decade demonstrating the reality that
new sports stadiums do not improve the qualities of life in the local
areas that construct them," the facilities continue to be built. 269
Therefore, a NAFTA Party may encounter some difficulty resting its
policy justification for public assistance to professional sports
franchises on the projected benefits to economic development.
Although the "consumer" benefits of hosting a professional sports
franchise might justify use of a public-goods explanation for
municipal investment, these benefits are difficult to capture, and
likely would not be a strong foundation for an explanation of the less270
favorable treatment.
E. U.S. Municipal Assistance Injures CanadianFranchises
If successful in showing that (1) investors in Canadian
professional sports franchises are within the scope of the NAFTA, (2)
U.S. assistance to franchises is a "measure" within the meaning of the
chapter on investment, and (3) there has been some violation of the
substantive guarantee of national treatment, a claimant must still
show economic injury and that the government measure caused the
injury. This element may be surprisingly difficult to prove, as a
plaintiff will have to establish a rational connection between U.S.
measures and Canadian franchise losses.2 71 One reason this is likely
to be difficult is the extent to which Canadian tax policies are causing
the Canadian franchises' financial distress. 272 Assessing the separate
economic impact of these factors will not be easy, and the task is
made even more difficult because the measures complained of cause
harm to Canadian franchises indirectly (if at all), through the
advantage conferred on domestic franchises and the manifestation of
that advantage in competitive common markets. One way to frame
this argument might be simply to say that Canadian franchises are
harmed in the amount of the benefits given by U.S. local governments
to favored domestic investors, yet the allegation of loss suffered by
the investor seems to demand that the claimant prove some harm in

268.
See supra Part II.A.2 and accompanying notes.
269.
Smith, supra note 18, at 58.
270.
See Baim, supra note 69. "Consumer benefits" are the indirect ways cities
and individuals might derive value from a professional sports franchise and from
municipal investment in a facility. See also Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 71, at 87;
Sanderson, supranote 69, at 190.
271.
See Weiler, supra notes 165, at 69-78.
272.
See supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
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the competitive market as a result of the affirmative assistance to
another investor.

V. WHY NOT PROTECT PROFESSIONAL HOCKEY FRANCHISES THROUGH
THE CULTURAL EXCEPTION?

Hockey is culturally important to Canada. In the middle of the
last decade it was estimated that more than five million Canadians
(one out of five citizens at the time) were involved in hockey-playing,
273
officiating, coaching, or as parents of a child in a youth league.
Canadian playwright Rick Salutin wrote,
In a general sense hockey is one of the few things that makes this place
coherent. In the U.S. there's no worry that the country will cease to
exist. Here, there's a sense the country is falling apart. With free
[and] issues of national
trade, the threat of Quebec separation ....
274
sovereignty, hockey assumes a sense of national loss.

A U.S. journalist observed that "Canada is furious over the loss of two
hockey franchises"-those formerly located in Quebec and
Winnipeg.2 75 And nearly half of Canadians polled by the Canadian
national government agreed "hockey deserved as much attention as
276
cultural industries."
Canadian politicians have also responded to the emigration of its
hockey franchises with claims about the game's cultural significance.
Then Quebec City Mayor Jean-Paul L'Allier told reporters in 1995
that, "Hockey is part of the Canadian sports heritage. The federal
government acts to protect cinema, books, [and] magazines. What
have they done to save the hockey heritage?" 277 Dennis Mills, then a
member of the Canadian Parliament, opined, "We've always talked
about hockey's cultural role because Canadians are so emotionally
involved with it," but added
it's time we look at it as an industry. If we thought General Motors was
going to pull a van plant out of Oshawa Ont[ario], we'd go crazy and
We can tell you in forestry and
make sure it didn't happen.
automobiles how many jobs, skilled and unskilled, there are in every
If we, as
Ask about hockey, and we draw a blank.
sector.

Farber, supra note 111, at 104.
273.
Id.
274.
George Kantor, Stadium Subsidy Dispute Takes Center Ice, DETROIT NEWS,
275.
May 27, 1998, at All.
Rick Gibbons, Manley's Doomed Deal, OTTAWA SUN, Jan. 21, 2001, at C3.
276.
Farber, supra note 111. L'Allier went on to predict the NHL's departure
277.
not only from Quebec City, but also Winnipeg, which lost its franchise less than five
years later. Id. See supra Part II.A.3.c.
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278
we're losing a big job-creation project.

So why is professional hockey not among the industries that are
protected under the Cultural Exception to the U.S.-Canada Free
Trade Agreement later adopted by the NAFTA?2 79 This Note argues
that there are three possible explanations for the omission of
professional hockey from the list of industries that do receive such
protection.
First, Canadian representatives likely focused on
importation of threats to the Canadian culture rather than
exportation of culturally relevant industries.
Second, Canadian
lawmakers and negotiators may have overlooked professional hockey
in the cultural exception because it is so inextricably related to the
culture that there was no apparent cause for concern. Third, and
most likely, what is culturally important to Canadians is the game of
hockey, and not the NHL or any other professional manifestation of
the game.
First, in creating the exception to the Free Trade Agreement,
Canadian policymakers anticipated the encroachment of United
States popular culture, not the possibility that the U.S. might
expropriate important elements of Canadian culture. This seems
particularly true in light of the fact that all of the protected
industries-books, magazines, periodicals, newspapers, film or video
recordings, audio or video music recordings, music in print, and
machine-readable form and radio communications 28 0 -can be
generated in large quantities by the United States and distributed
quickly and cheaply into the Canadian culture. Although the loss of
professional hockey franchises may damage a cultural industry, it
does so in a completely different way than that contemplated by the
exception. Because the exception focuses on inflows of cultural
material, it could not possibly have encompassed the instant concern.
Second, hockey may be so ingrained in Canadian culture that no
one anticipated that the future of the NHL in Canada would be in
serious jeopardy. The cultural exception to the U.S.-Canada Free
Trade Agreement was crafted in 1988,281 seven years before the
Quebec Nordiques left Quebec City to play in Denver, Colorado, 28 2 six
years before the Jets left Winnipeg to play in Phoenix, 28 3 and 15
years before the Ottawa Senators were put up for sale out of

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

Id.
For a description of the Cultural Exception, see supra Part III.B.
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement art. 2012.
Id.
See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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bankruptcy in 2003.284 It is conceivable that Canadian lawmakers
never imagined that their professional hockey franchises would leave
Canada for the United States, and therefore that there was no reason
to except professional hockey from the operation of the Free Trade
Agreement.
Third, it may be that what is culturally important to most
Canadians is the game of hockey, and not necessarily the NHL
franchises that presently operate there.
This explanation is
consistent both with high participation in hockey and hockey-related
activities, 28 5 as well as with general public disapproval of subsidies to
Canadian NHL franchises. For example, Canadian Federal Industry
Minister John Manley proposed a multi-million dollar bailout of the
Canadian NHL franchises in 2000 and found that there was very
little public support for the subsidies.2 86 Described as a "gale-force
public backlash," a poll found that only 36 percent of Canadians
considered themselves hockey fans and 35 percent said they would
not be troubled by the departure of several of the nation's remaining
teams.28 7 Perhaps most importantly, 79 percent of Canadians polled
agreed that NHL franchises "should have no more expectation of
government support than any other business in Canada. '288 In
addition to explaining the omission of professional hockey in the
Cultural Exception to the Agreement, this hypothesis may also
explain the decision, to this point, of Canadian federal and provincial
governments not to seek the relief described in this Note.
Robert A. Schmoll*

284.
Westhead, supra note 13.
285.
See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
286.
Gibbons, supra note 276. Note that this poll was conducted by the
Canadian government and surveyed only 1,500 Canadians.
287.
Id.
288.
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